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Abstract
We measure the impact of a drastic new technology for producing steel – the minimill – on
the aggregate productivity of U.S. steel producers, using unique plant-level data between 1963 and
2002. We find that the sharp increase in the industry’s productivity is linked to this new technology
through two distinct mechanisms. First, minimills displaced the older technology, called vertically
integrated production, and this reallocation of output was responsible for a third of the increase
in the industry’s productivity. Second, increased competition, due to the expansion of minimills,
drove a substantial reallocation process within the group of vertically integrated producers, driving
a resurgence in their productivity and, consequently, the productivity of the industry as a whole.
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1 Introduction
Identifying the sources of productivity growth of firms, industries, and countries, has been a central
question for economic research. There remain, however, many empirical obstacles to credibly iden-
tifying the underlying sources of productivity growth. First, the measurement of productivity at the
producer level typically requires an estimate of the production function and, therefore, has to confront
both the endogeneity of inputs and unobserved prices for inputs and outputs. Second, it is difficult
to observe potential explanatory variables at the producer level, such as technology, competition, and
management practices.1 Finally, in order to establish causality, exogenous shifters of such variables are
required in order to trace out their effects on productivity.
A recent literature has emphasized the distinction between the productivity effects that occur at
the producer level, and those realized by moving resources between producers – i.e., the reallocation
mechanism. Although it is now well established, at both a theoretical and empirical level, that the
reallocation of resources across producers is important in explaining aggregate outcomes, it has been
very hard to identify the exact mechanisms behind it.2 In this paper, we focus on the role of technology
and the associated changes in competition in driving the reallocation process underlying aggregate
productivity growth.
We examine one particular industry, the U.S. steel sector, for which we have detailed producer-level
production and price data. Our setting is well suited to measuring the role of technological change,
since we directly observe the exogenous arrival of a new production process – the minimill – at the
plant level. In addition, we observe detailed output and input data, including physical measures of
inputs and outputs, as well as standard revenue and expenditure data, to obtain measures of productivity
and market power. These inputs and outputs are remarkably unchanging over a 40-year period, and the
steel products shipped in the 1960s are very similar to those shipped in 2002. Thus, productivity growth
in steel is almost uniquely driven by process innovation, rather than through the introduction of new
goods. Observing a panel of steel producers over a 40-year period, 1963-2002, allows us to study the
long-run implications of increased competition, such as the slow entry and exit process.
The U.S. steel industry shed about 75 percent of its workforce between 1962 and 2005, or about
400,000 employees. This dramatic fall in employment has far-reaching economic and social implica-
tions. For example, between 1950 and 2000, Pittsburgh – which used to be the center of the U.S. Steel
Industry – dropped from the tenth-largest city in the United States to the 52nd largest.
While employment in the steel sector fell by a factor of five, shipments of steel products in 2005
1See Syverson (2011) for an excellent overview of the various potential determinants of productivity at both the producer
and the industry level. Two prominent studies on the triggers of productivity growth are Schmitz (2005) and Olley and
Pakes (1996), who study the role of two such triggers: import competition in the iron ore market and deregulation in the
telecommunications market. Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004), Bloom et al. (2013b), and Jarmin et al. (2009) show that factors
such as vertical integration, management, and large retail chains lead to systematic differences in productivity between plants
and consequently, have implications for aggregate industry performance.
2For instance, Melitz (2003), shows how trade liberalization impacts aggregate productivity through a reallocation towards
more-productive firms, while Foster et al. (2001) and Bartelsman et al. (2009) document the role of reallocation empirically.
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reached the level of the early 1960s. Thus, output per worker grew by a factor of five, while total factor
productivity (TFP) increased by 38 percent. This makes the steel sector one of the fastest growing
of the manufacturing industries over the last three decades, behind only the computer software and
equipment industries. We highlight the special features of the U.S. steel industry in Table 1, where we
report its change in output, input use, TFP and prices over the period 1972-2002 and compare it to the
mean and median manufacturing sector’s experience.
Table 1 points out the unique feature of the steel industry: The period of impressive productivity
growth – 28 percent compared to the median of three percent – occurred while the sector contracted by
35 percent. The starkest difference is the drop in employment of 80 percent compared to a decline of
five percent for the average sector.
We find that the main reason for the rapid productivity growth and the associated decline in em-
ployment is neither a steady drop in steel consumption nor the emergence of globalization. Nor is it a
displacement of production away from the midwest. The increase in productivity can be directly linked
to the introduction of a new production technology, the steel minimill. The minimill displaced the older
technology, called vertically integrated production, and this reallocation of output was responsible for
about a third of the increase in the industry’s total factor productivity. In addition, minimills’ produc-
tivity steadily increased. We can directly attribute almost half of the aggregate productivity growth in
steel to the entry of this new technology.
However, the older technology was not entirely displaced. Instead, vertically integrated producers
experienced a dramatic resurgence of productivity and, by 2002, were on average, as productive as min-
imills. This resurgence was not driven by improvements at integrated plants. Rather, less-productive
vertically integrated plants were driven out of the industry, and output was reallocated to more-efficient
producers. We see exit of vertically integrated producers in precisely the product segments where they
competed head-to-head with minimills.
When we evaluate the impact of a drastic technological change on aggregate productivity growth,
we also control for other potential drivers of productivity growth, including international competition,
geography, and firm-level factors such as organization and management. We also show that markups in
this industry fell by 50 percent over the last 40-years, which is not surprising if we look at the output
and input price changes in Table 1. This increase in productivity, and fall in markups, jointly lead to a
predicted increase in consumer surplus of between nine and 11 billion dollars per year.
In addition to identifying the exact mechanisms underlying productivity growth, which are of in-
terest to a growing literature on reallocation and productivity dispersion, the steel industry is also
important in and of itself. Even today, it is one of the largest sectors in U.S. manufacturing: In 2007,
steel plants had shipments of over 100 billion dollars, of which half was value added. Therefore,
understanding the sources of productivity growth in this industry is of independent interest.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. In Section 3, we
present five key facts that help guide the empirical analysis, which we take up in Sections 4 and 5. We
discuss alternative specifications and robustness in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
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2 Data
We study the production of steel: plants engaged in the production of either carbon or alloy steels. We
rely on detailed Census micro data to investigate the mechanisms underlying the impressive productiv-
ity growth in the U.S. steel sector. Our analysis is based on plant-level production data of U.S. steel
mills from 1963 to 2002.
We use data provided by the Center for Economics Studies at the United States Census Bureau.
Our primary sources are the Census of Manufacturers (CMF), the Annual Survey of Manufacturers
(ASM), and the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). We select plants engaged in the production of
steel, coded in either NAICS (North American Industrial Classification) code 33111, or SIC (Standard
Industrial Classification) code 3312. The CMF is sent to all steel mills every five years, while the ASM
is sent to about 50 percent of plants in non-Census years. However, the ASM samples all plants with
over 250 employees and, encompasses over 90 percent of the steel sector’s output.
In addition, we collect data on the products produced at each plant using the product trailer to the
CMF and the ASM, and we collect the materials consumed by these plants from the material trailer to
the CMF.
We rely on our detailed micro data to divide steel mills into two technologies: Minimills (MM,
hereafter) and Vertically Integrated (VI, hereafter) Producers. VI production takes place in two steps.
The first stage takes place in a blast furnace, which combines coke, iron ore, and limestone to produce
pig iron and slag. In the second stage, the pig iron, along with oxygen and fuel, is then used in a basic
oxygen furnace (BOF) to produce steel.3 The steel products produced in either MM or VI plants are
shaped into sheets, bars, wire, and tube in rolling mills. These rolling mills are frequently collocated
with steel mills, but can also be freestanding units.
In contrast, MMs are identified primarily by the use of an electric arc furnace (EAF) to melt down
a combination of scrap steel and direct reduced iron.4 Because these mills have a far smaller efficient
scale, they are, on average, an order of magnitude smaller than vertically integrated producers. His-
torically, EAFs were used to produce lower-quality steel, such as that used to make steel bars, while
virtually all steel sheet (needing higher-quality steel) was produced in BOFs. However, since the mid-
1980s, innovation in the EAFs has enabled them to produce certain types of sheet products, as well.5
We classify plants as minimills, vertically integrated plants, and rolling mills using their responses
3There were a few open-hearth furnaces in operation during the sample period. However, as of the late 1960s, open-hearth
plants accounted for only a very small portion of output, and the last open-hearth plant closed in 1991. See Oster (1982) for
more on the diffusion of BOF mills.
4The median scrap vintage is quite old, as one would expect, with items such as rails, construction rebar, and other white
goods accounting for a large share of scrap. Moreover, in the United States, there is an abundant supply of scrap. Indeed,
the largest steel export from the United States, by quite a margin, is steel scrap destined for minimills in China and Japan. It
is also possible to produce steel in a minimill without scrap: Direct Reduced Iron (DRI) is a substitute for scrap. Typically,
the prices for DRI have been higher than for scrap, but minimills could also exist in a world without vertically integrated
production of steel. There was a worry in the industry during the 1970s that scrap would become scarce, and, thus, some
direct reduced iron facilities were built. See Chapter 5, page 95, in Barnett and Crandall (1986) for a discussion.
5EAFs have a long history in steel making. However, before the 1960s, they primarily produced specialty steels.
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to a specific questionnaire on steel mills attached to the 1992, 1997, and 2002 CMF. For prior years,
we use the material and products produced by each plant to identify MM and VI plants. More detail
on the classification of plants can be found in Appendix A. Table B.1 shows summary statistics for the
sample of MM and VI plants. The average VI plant had shipments of 647 million dollars, of which 47
percent is value added, while the average MM plant shipped 153 million dollars, of which 44 percent
is value added, where all dollar amounts are in 1997 $.
3 Key Facts in the U.S. Steel Sector 1963-2002
In this section, we briefly go over some key facts of the U.S. steel sector. These facts will be important
to keep in mind when we analyze the sources of productivity growth.
3.1 Stagnant Shipments, Rising Productivity
From Table 1, we know that the productivity growth in the U.S. steel sector was one of the fastest in
manufacturing. To better understand this period of impressive productivity growth, we plot total output
next to labor and capital use in Figure 1. An important observation is that the period of productivity
growth came about while the industry as a whole contracted severely: Steel producers sold about 60
billion dollars in 1960 and, reached 100 billion dollars in shipments by the early 1970s. A decade later,
only 40 billion dollars of production was shipped, or, put differently, the sector’s shipments decreased
by more than half.
Total employment, on the other hand, decreased consistently, even during the recovery of output in
the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. The employment panel of Figure 1 shows that total employ-
ment fell from 500,000 to 100,000 employees – one of the sharpest drops in employment experienced
by any sector in the U.S. economy. By 2000, the steel industry employed a fifth of the number of work-
ers that it had in 1960, while production of steel went from 130 million tons in 1960 to 110 million
tons in 2000. This implies that output per worker increased from 260 to 1100 tons.6 Total material
use tracks output quite closely, while labor and capital fell continuously over the entire period, which
suggests that TFP had to increase to offset the sharp drop in labor and capital.7
3.2 A New Production Technology: Minimills
The entry of minimills in steel production constituted a drastic change in the actual production process
of steel products. A natural question to ask is whether MM are any different than the traditional VI steel
producers. We rely on a descriptive OLS regression, where we regress various plant characteristics on
6Shipments of steel in tons are collected from various Iron and Steel Institute Annual Statistical Reports (American Iron
and Steel Institute, 2010).
7For this aggregate analysis, we rely on the NBER’s five-factor TFP estimate. See Bartelsman et al. (2000) for more
detail.
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an indicator variable for whether a plant is a vertically integrated producer. We consider a log specifi-
cation such that the coefficient on the technology dummy directly measures the percentage premium of
VI plants.
Table B.2 lists the set of estimated coefficients, and confirms that vertically integrated producers
are, on average, four times bigger, as measured by the large coefficients on shipments, value added, and
inputs. For example, VI plants, on average, ship 144 percent more than MMs. Moreover, VI producers
generate about 20 percent more shipments per worker, which suggests that they are more productive.
However, when we combine the coefficients on all three inputs (labor, materials and capital) with the
shipment premium, we see that total factor productivity (TFP) of MM is at least as high as that of VI
producers. We conduct a more precise comparison of TFP across technologies in Section 4.
In addition to the average premium over the entire sample, we report time-specific coefficients.
Across all the various characteristics, the VI coefficient falls over time. Most notably, shipments per
worker were 23-percent higher for VI plants in 1963, but by 2002, there was no significant difference
between the two technologies in terms of labor productivity. This pattern suggests that, over time, VI
and MM producers became more alike, although VI producers still produce on a larger scale.
The coefficients on wages of six percent, shown in the last row of Table B.2, confirms the well-
known fact that VI producers, on average, pay higher wages. This is likely due to the impact of union-
ization – minimill workers typically being non-unionized.8 It is interesting to note that this average
difference in wages of six percent would only translate into a difference in costs of only 1.2 percent
given the input share of labor for steel producers.
We also find large differences in standard measures of performance, such as profit margins, defined
as sales minus cost of materials and salaries over sales, and the rate of return on capital, defined as sales
minus cost of materials and salaries over capital. Table B.4 considers quantile regressions of either the
profit margin or the rate of return on capital on an indicator for whether or not a plant is vertically
integrated, along with a full set of year fixed-effects. We find that minimills have a rate of return on
capital that is 18-percent higher than for vertically integrated plants. In addition, minimills have a
profit margin that is four-percent higher than that of vertically integrated plants. Minimills are less
capital-intensive than vertically integrated plants, and this explains some of the discrepancy between
these measures of profitability.
An important difference between MM and VI producers is the set of products they manufacture.
Figure 2 shows that in 1997, MMs accounted for 59 percent and 68 percent of shipments of steel
ingots and hot-rolled bar respectively, but only 15 percent and 14 percent of hot and cold rolled sheet.
MMs typically produce lower-quality steel products, which are generally thicker products, while VI
plants produce higher-quality products, which are usually sheet products. However, the product mix
accounted for by MMs changed dramatically over the last 40 years. Figure 2 shows that, in 1977, MMs
produced 27 percent of steel ingots and 24 percent of hot-rolled bar. Between 1977 and 1982, MMs
8See Hoerr (1988) – and in particular, page 16 – for evidence of the role of unionization on wages for VI and MM
producers. We discuss the role of unions in more detail in Section 4.2
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increased their share of both of these products to 40 percent, and by 2002, they produced 81 percent of
hot-rolled bar. As stated above, in 1997, only 15 percent and 14 percent of hot and cold rolled sheet
were produced by MMs.9 Thus, the market share of MMs in the higher-quality product segments, sheet
products, was rather stable up to 1997, after which their market shares increased substantially.
3.3 A Stable Product Mix over Time
We list the product mix of the steel industry in Table B.3. We break down steel into various products:
a) hot-rolled steel sheet (HRS); b) hot-rolled bar (HRB); c) cold-rolled sheet (CRS); d) ingots and
shapes; e) pipe and tube (P&T); f) Wire g) cold-finished bars (CFB); and h) coke oven and blast
furnace products (Blast). Over 40 years, the product mix for steel has barely changed. Hot-rolled sheet
accounted for 23 percent of shipments in 1963 and 31 percent in 2002, and hot-rolled bar accounted
for 23 percent of shipments in 1963 and 22 percent in 2002.
The fact that the steel industry’s products have been unchanged is essential for our identification of
productivity growth, as the industry’s production process has changed far more than its products.
3.4 Heterogeneous Price Trends Across Products
While steel producers’ product mix has been relatively unchanged from 1963 to today, the prices for
these products have dropped considerably, which is not surprising given the large increases in TFP in
the industry. Panel A of Figure 3 presents the price indices for the four main products – hot and cold
rolled sheet, hot rolled bar and steel ingots – which, taken together, represent 80 percent of shipments
in 1997.10
The same panel shows that the prices of all steel products followed a very similar, and gradually
increasing, pattern up to 1980. But from 1982 to 2000, we see 50-percent drop in the real price of
steel. This implies that, while shipments of steel in dollars dropped since 1980, the quantity shipped
has gradually increased since the mid-1980s (see Panel 1 of Figure 1).11
In addition, when we decompose these price trends further, we find that the prices of hot-rolled
bars and steel ingots have fallen faster than the prices of hot and cold rolled sheet. While sheet steel
is produced primarily by VI producers, prices for bar and ingot products fell by ten percent more than
those for sheet products in 1982-1984. This occurred precisely at the point at which MMs saw an
increase in their market share of bar and ingot products.
Turning to prices for inputs, we construct an intermediate input price index Pnt for each intermedi-
ate input n, where n = {Fuels, Electricity, Coal for Coke, Iron Ore, and Scrap Steel}, using either the
NBER fuel price deflator, or reported quantities and costs in the material trailer to the CMF (which
9Giarratani et al. (2007) discuss the entry of Minimills into the production of sheet products around 1990.
10We have taken care to deflate these price indices by the GDP deflator to show price trends for steel relative to the rest of
the economy.
11Annual reports of the American Iron and Steel Institute (2010), where total tons of steel are recorded annually, indicate
that quantity produced increased by about 30 percent between 1982 and 2002.
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allow us to back out prices). We construct a plant-specific input price index (PMit ) using a weighted
average of these intermediate input-specific prices, Pnt, where the weights are the share of an interme-
diate n in total intermediate input use.12
We present the time series pattern of our constructed input price index in Panel B of Figure 3. We
compare the publicly available NBER Material Price Index (NBER MPI) with our constructed input
price index. We compute the mean of the latter by technology and find that the NBER MPI follows our
price index closely. However, the aggregate input price index hides the heterogeneity in input prices,
especially during the energy price spike in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While input prices were
very similar around 1972, by 1982, integrated producers faced almost 20-percent-higher input prices,
primarily because they purchased more energy-intensive inputs.
Therefore, in order to correctly identify the productivity effect of the arrival of the minimills, and
their associated increased competition, it will be imperative to control for price differences, for both
inputs and outputs, across plants and time.
3.5 Simultaneous Entry and Exit
From Figure 1, we know that the number of plants increased over time. In Table 2, we go a step further,
showing both the number of MM and VI plants that entered or exited, as well as the market share these
plants represent. There was marked entry of new plants in the early 1980s, a period during which the
industry as a whole severely contracted.
The market share of plants entering from 1982 to 1992 was 20 percent, versus five percent in the
previous two decades, while the market share of exiters was 18 percent during this period. Most entry
in this period was due to minimills, and most exit was from vertically integrated producers.13 From
these entry and exit statistics, we expect an important role for entry and exit in explaining productivity
growth.
4 Drivers of productivity growth
The previous section highlighted the difference in performance between MM and VI producers, and
suggested a large potential role for reallocation across these technologies in explaining productivity
growth. This paper is concerned with studying the productivity differences in detail and verifying
the extent to which the entry of minimills contributed to the stark aggregate productivity growth in
the industry. We proceed in two steps. First, we present our empirical framework used to estimate
the production function and establish the productivity premium of minimills. Second, we verify the
robustness of this premium by considering alternative drivers of productivity growth.
12Appendix C describes the construction of the input price index in detail.
13This phenomenon, the speeding up of exit and entry during a downturn, has been documented by Bresnahan and Raff
(1991) for the motor vehicles industry during the Great Depression.
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4.1 Productivity Differences Across Technology
Denote each technology – either MM or VI – as ψ ∈ {V I,MM}.14 A plant i at time t can produce
output Qijt of a given product j, using a technology ψ specific production technology:
Qijt = Fψ,t(Lijt,Mijt,Kijt) exp(ωit). (1)
Our notation highlights that VI and MM producers rely on different technologies, which we allow
to vary over time. As is common in the literature, productivity ωit is modeled as a Hicks-neutral term.
Moreover, we assume that productivity is plant-specific.
4.1.1 Measurement
Recovering productivity using revenue and expenditure data requires that we correct for potential price
variation across plants and time, for both output and inputs.
In order to recover productivity, ωit, using product-level revenue data for each plant, we assume that
each product j is homogeneous, and we construct a plant-specific output price (Pit) using product-level
BLS price data and then match that in with our production data.15
The bulk of quality variation operates across across product codes, particularly when it comes to
comparing bar products to sheet products – perhaps the most obvious quality metric being how thick
the steel product is, which determines the value for downstream users such as car producers and the
construction industry. Our measures of productivity are designed to control for quality differences that
materialize through price differences and allow for the comparison of plant-level productivity across
producers of different product mixes. Of course, to the extent that there are quality differences across
plants within our narrowly defined products – for example, Hot Rolled Bars broken into low-quality
rebar used for reinforcing concrete versus higher-quality structural steel used to make frames for build-
ings – our measure of productivity will pick up these differences in quality as differences in output.16
The working assumption is, thus, that the main quality differences exist among the nine product codes,
and that the variation within products across plants comes from the cost side – i.e., through productivity
differences.
We observe product-level revenues for each plant (Rijt), while we only see total plant-level input
(Xit) and product-specific prices (Pjt). We follow the literature and consider a Cobb-Douglas speci-
fication by type, and we consider the following production function for product j at plant i and time
t:
14In the steel industry, a plant cannot switch technology, such as a VI plant becoming a MM. This is in contrast to the
a setting of technology adoption, such as Van Biesebroeck (2003)’s empirical analysis of technology adoption in U.S. car
manufacturing.
15We constructed nine product categories, which correspond to 7-digit NAICS codes, which are the most detailed plant
level production statistics we have access to at Census.
16This is a standard problem in the literature, and with the exception of a few papers, such as De Loecker (2011);
De Loecker et al. (2012), the norm is not to have any control for quality, let alone within a narrowly defined product cat-
egory.
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Qijt = XijtΩit. (2)
The input bundle Xijt contains of labor, intermediate inputs and capital, scaled by their corresponding
technology parameters, Xijt = L
βl
ijtK
βk
ijtM
βm
ijt . Productivity is assumed to be plant-specific, and this
follows the tradition in the treatment of multi-product firms in industrial organization and international
trade.17
Consider plant-level revenue, by first multiplying both sides byPjtand then summing across product-
specific revenues to obtain:
Rit =
∑
j
XijtΩitPjt. (3)
We are interested in recovering a measure of productivity at the plant level, and, therefore we
aggregate up to plant-level sales. However, a common restriction in these type of data is that we do not
directly observe the input use by product (see Foster et al. (2008)). We allocate inputs across products
using product-specific sales shares, sijt =
Rijt
Rit
, such that Xijt ≡ sijtXit with X = {L,M,K}. As
discussed in detail in Appendix C, this implies that we implicitly restrict markups to be common across
products within a plant. We are not interested in explaining within-plant markup differences across
products, but mainly aim to recover measures of plant-level productivity that are not contaminated by
price variation across plants and time. Using this input allocation rule for the three inputs we get:
Rit∑
j s
γ
ijtPjt
= LβlijtK
βk
ijtM
βm
ijt Ωit, (4)
where γ = βl + βm + βk, or in logs:
rit − p˜it = βllit + βkkit + βmmit + ωit, (5)
where p˜it ≡
∑
j sijtPjt is the plant-level output price deflator, and ωit = ln (Ωit), and we use that the
(log) input bundle can be decomposed into labor and capital input, scaled by their corresponding output
elasticity β. Moving from equation (4) to (5) restricts the attention to constant returns to scale, γ = 1.
First, we find strong evidence for constant returns to scale in our data. Second, our approach would
only be modified by the inclusion of an additional term
∑
j(sijt)
γPjt in the estimating equation, and
this has no implications for our analysis.
Although the focus in the literature has been mainly on the heterogeneity of output prices, input
price variation potentially plagues the measurement of productivity, as well. The data on intermediate
input use, Mit, are potentially the most contaminated by input price variation, both in the time-series
and in the cross-section, particularly between MM and VI plants. The two technologies use vastly
different intermediate inputs or use inputs at very different intensities, and, therefore, we expect the
17See De Loecker et al. (2012) for more discussion.
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relevant input price to vary substantially across plants of different technologies.18
We construct our input price deflators in a similar way as the output price deflator. First, we need to
distinguish between our three main input categories: labor, intermediate inputs and capital. We directly
observe labor Lit: hours worked at the plant-level. For capital, we rely on the NBER capital deflator
(PKt ) to correct the capital stock series. For materials, we use our plant-level input price deflator P
M
it .
We estimate the production function using our constructed output and input price deflators, by type,
using:
q˜it = βllit + βmmit + βkkit + ωit + it, (6)
where lower cases indicate logs of deflated variables when appropriate – i.e., q˜it = qit + it and
qit = rit − p˜it and mit = ln
(∑
n
MEint
Pnt
)
. We allow for unanticipated shocks to production and
measurement error in output and prices, as captured by it.19 In the next subsection, we discuss the
estimation and identification of equation (6).
4.1.2 Estimation of production functions
We take equation (6) to the data and rely on a plant’s optimal investment to control for unobserved
productivity shocks. We estimate the production function rather than impute the production function
coefficients from first-order conditions (FOC). This FOC approach infers production function coeffi-
cients from input revenue shares, where the coefficient on labor, for example, is simply given by the
wage bill over sales. This approach requires that all inputs are fully flexible, which seems implausible
in the steel industry given the irreversibility of capital investments and union labor contracts. As well,
both output and input markets must be perfectly competitive for the FOC approach to be valid.
Our setting is very closely related to that of Olley and Pakes (1996), who use U.S. Census plant-
level data on telecommunication equipment producers. While they are interested in a sales-generating
production function, they are concerned that unobserved productivity shocks ωit will bias the pro-
duction function coefficients. This will lead to incorrect measures of productivity, and, thus, of any
subsequent analysis of reallocation. To deal with the correlation between inputs and productivity (the
simultaneity bias), and the non-random exit of plants (the selection bias), the authors rely on a plant’s
optimal investment equation to control for unobserved productivity shocks. We modify their approach
and include the technology indicator, ψi, as a state variable in the firm’s underlying dynamic problem.20
18See Appendix C.2.2 for more detail on this point.
19Formally, the inclusion of it is compatible with the existence of measurement error and unanticipated shocks in both
revenue and price data. Thus, the error term it captures, potentially, multiple iid error terms. The distinction is not important
for our analysis.
20Plants never switch technologies. Therefore, we simply index all policy functions by ψ to allow the different technologies
to face different demand or competitive conditions. In our main specification, we pool both technologies, and, therefore,
indexing the policy functions by the technology is crucial. The pooling across all plants is useful, as we obtain one constant
term, and can compare productivity levels across plants of different technologies.
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The firm’s state is sit ≡ {kit, ωit, ψi}, and its investment policy function is, therefore, given by:
iit = it(kit, ωit, ψi). (7)
Following Olley and Pakes (1996), we invert the investment function to obtain a control function
for productivity: ωit = hψ,t(kit, iit).21 We consider a first stage in which we relate output q˜it to a
flexible function of inputs (lit,mit, kit), investment, the technology dummy and year controls:
q˜it = φψ,t(lit,mit, kit, iit) + it. (8)
This first stage serves to purge measurement error and unanticipated shocks to production (it) form
the variation in output. Consequently, after this first stage, we know productivity up to the vector of
(unknown) production function coefficients β: ωit(β) ≡ φˆit − βllit − βmmit − βkkit.
A key component in the estimation routine is the law of motion on productivity that describes
how a plant’s productivity changes over time. The preliminary analysis indicates that exit, primarily
by integrated mills, was substantial. We allow plant survival to depend on the plant’s state variables,
which, in our case, include the technology dummy in addition to productivity, and capital. Following
Olley and Pakes (1996), we rely on a nonparametric estimate of the plant’s survival at time t, given the
information set at time t− 1, It−1.
Define an indicator function χit to be equal to one if the firm remains active, and zero if it exits, and
let ωit = ωt(kit, ψi) be the productivity threshold a firm has to clear in order to survive. The selection
rule can be rewritten as:
Pr(χit = 1) = Pr [ωit ≥ ωt(kit, ψi)|Iit−1]
= Pr [ωit ≥ ωt(kit, ψi)|ωt(kit, ψi), ωit−1]
= ρt−1(ωt(kit, ψi), ωit−1) = ρt−1(ωt(δkit−1 + iit−1, ψi), ωit−1)
= ρt−1(kit−1, iit−1, ψi, ωit−1)
= ρt−1(kit−1, iit−1, ψi) ≡ Pit.
(9)
We use the fact that the threshold at t is predicted using the firm’s state variables at t − 1 . As
in Olley and Pakes (1996), we have two different indexes of firm heterogeneity: productivity and the
productivity cutoff. Note that Pit = ρt−1(ωit−1, ωit, ψi), and, therefore, ωit = ρ−1t−1(ωit−1, ψi,Pit).
To the extent that vertically integrated plants are larger and, thus, more likely to remain in the indus-
try, this will generate different exit policies for minimills and vertically integrated plants. This survival
probability is identified off the timing assumption, just as in Olley and Pakes, that a plant decides to
21Note that the inclusion of extra fixed and observed state variables does not affect the invertibility – which covers exactly
the case of our technology dummy. In addition, almost no plants report zero investment in a given year, so we can compute
the control function for almost all plants in the sample. Plugging this control function into equation (6) would, in principle,
allow us to identify the coefficients on variable inputs. However, we forgo identifying these coefficients in a first stage in
order to relax the – by and large untestable – timing assumptions (see Ackerberg et al. (2007)).
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continue production if the expected value of doing so is greater than the value of exiting, where this
expectation is based on what the plant knows at time t − 1 – i.e., the identification of this survival
probability does not depend on a particular functional form, or a standard exclusion restriction.22
We consider the following productivity process:
ωit = gψ(ωit−1, ωit) + ξit
= gψ(ωit−1, ρ−1t−1(ωit−1,Pit)) + ξit
= gψ(ωit−1,Pit) + ξit.
(10)
Note that this process can vary between minimills and vertically integrated plants; as we have seen
in the OLS regressions, vertically integrated plants slowly catch up to minimills.
We recover estimates of the production function coefficients, β, by forming moments on this pro-
ductivity shock ξit, and we rely on the following moments:
E
ξit(β)
 lit−1mit−1
kit

 = 0. (11)
The identification of these coefficients relies on the rate at which inputs adjust to these shocks. In
particular, we allow capital have a one-period time-to-build, so that capital does not react to current
shocks to productivity (ξit). Plants do, however, adjust their labor and intermediate input use (scrap,
energy, other material inputs) to the arrival of a productivity shock ξit.23
4.1.3 Production function coefficients and technology premium
We consider different specifications for the production function in Tables 3 and 4, which present es-
timates of the production function for both GMM estimates – i.e., those that use the Olley-Pakes ap-
proach outlined in the previous section, versus estimates using OLS. While Table 3 is concerned with
differences in the production function between minimills and vertically integrated plants, Table 4 fo-
cuses on the effects of including plant-level price deflators for both inputs and output while pooling
across both technologies.
Technology-specific production functions
22Formally, there are two different nonparametric functions controlling for productivity and the lower bound threshold for
productivity, and it is precisely the notion that information available to the plant at t− 1 is used to form predictions of future
profits, whereas current state variables provide information about current unobserved productivity shocks. See Olley and
Pakes (1996) for more details.
23See De Loecker (2011) for a detailed discussion of the inclusion of additional exogenous state variables in the investment
control. All our results are invariant to modifications of the timing assumptions discussed in the main text. Our approach is
flexible and can allow for a variety of production functions combined with various assumptions on the variability of inputs,
as well as the use of alternative proxies such as intermediate inputs – i.e. a modified Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimator.
In particular, we consider the case in which labor is a state variable, and our results are robust to this alternative. See Online
Appendix D.1 for more discussion on some of the technical issues.
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We start by estimating production function coefficients that are either allowed or not to differ by
technology, and use either GMM or OLS. Columns I and III in Table 3 show pooled estimates, while
Columns II and IV have interactions between inputs and an indicator for whether a plant is vertically
integrated.
The production function coefficients, across all specifications, are stable and imply reasonable esti-
mates of returns to scale and output elasticities. An important test for our purpose is to check whether
minimills and vertically integrated producers rely on different production functions. Note that none of
the interactions between inputs and an indicator for whether a plant is vertically integrated are statis-
tically significant – i.e., we cannot reject the hypothesis that the production function coefficients are
identical for both technologies. Moreover, we also run an F -test on the joint significance of the inter-
acted coefficients in Column II (OLS). In doing so, we cannot reject – at the 11-percent level – that
both technologies produce under the same output elasticities of labor, materials, and capital.24
At first, it might seem surprising that, say, the coefficient on materials does not vary across tech-
nologies. However, note that this coefficient reflects the importance of the total use of intermediate
inputs in final production. Aggregating over the various intermediate inputs into Mit masks the dis-
tinct inputs used in production, which differ tremendously by technology.25 Section D.3 of the Online
Appendix presents a models that allows for different bundles of total intermediate inputs M across
technologies, but these bundles themselves are produced using a Leontief fixed-proportion technology,
where the weights across the various inputs are technology-specific. This structure has the appeal that
different intermediate inputs, such as coal and iron ore, are non-substitutable for each other, but the
entire bundle of intermediate inputs M has the standard Cobb-Douglas elasticity of substitution with
respect to labor and capital.26
Price Deflators and Productivity Estimates
Table 4 present estimates of the production function for different price deflators, pooling across all
plants in the industry. Columns I and II show estimates where we deflate both inputs and outputs using
plant-specific price deflators, while Columns III and IV show the case where we use an industry-level
output price deflator, and Columns V and VI show estimates with an industry-level input price deflator.
Each pair of columns corresponds to the case where we first use GMM and then shows OLS results
to highlight the importance of our corrections. Finally, we compute productivity using the estimates
of the production function coefficients, and we project productivity against an indicator of whether a
plant is a vertically integrated producer, along with year fixed effects. We call this coefficient the VI
24One might also ask if the subsequent analysis in this paper is also affected by the focus on a single production function
for both technologies. In Section 6.1, we show that the point estimates for our productivity decompositions are virtually
identical if we allow (or do not allow) for different production functions by technology. However, we lose a large amount of
statistical power by allowing for this additional flexibility.
25For instance, in 2002, Iron and Steel Scrap represented 42 percent of the coded material inputs for minimills, and Coal
for the production of Coke represented 15 percent of the coded material inputs for vertically integrated plants. Table C.2 in
the Online Appendix shows the breakdown of materials for both minimills and vertically integrated plants.
26For example, a minimill could directly buy direct-reduced iron (DRI) instead of producing this in-house, thereby freeing
up labor and capital for production.
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premium.
Four main results emerge from this analysis. First, minimills are, on average, more productive, as
indicated by a negative coefficient on the VI dummy. Under specification II (OLS), minimills have a
two-percent-higher TFP than vertically integrated producers, but this is not statistically significantly
different from zero. This result is surprising, both since we have shown that minimills have higher
measures of profitability, and since these plants show large increases in market share over the sample
period.
Second, the differences in the estimates of the VI premium demonstrate the importance of control-
ling for plant-level price differences. When we correct for plant-specific output prices, we find that the
minimill TFP premium moves from 3.8 to 7.5 percent and becomes statistically significant. The impact
of including detailed price data on the technology coefficient is expected since we know from Figure
3 that VI plants are active in the relatively higher-quality segments, where output prices are higher.
Therefore, when we do not properly deflate the sales data, the productivity premium for minimills is
dampened. However, omitting the correction for input prices in Column IV does not substantially affect
the VI premium, moving it from 7.5 percent in Column I, to 7.6 percent in Column IV. Note, also, that
the estimates of the output elasticities are virtually identical whether or not we use plant specific-prices
to deflate inputs and output.
To understand the impact of our price corrections, we find it helpful to write out the potential bias
induced by not properly deflating either output or inputs. Without deflating, the following equation is
estimated on the data:
rit = βllit + βkkit + βmm
E
it + ωit + pit − βmpMit + it. (12)
This equation relates plant-level revenue (rit) to (physical) labor, capital, and intermediate input use
that potentially still contains input price variation (mEit ). In addition to unobserved productivity, and
a standard error term (), the production function includes two price errors: the output and the input
price. Two observations are important to make. First, we could obtain biased production function
coefficients, since input use is frequently correlated with output and input prices. Second, our estimate
for productivity will be contaminated by output and input price variation, and we would not correctly
identify the productivity difference between minimills and integrated plants. We refer the reader to De
Loecker (2011) and De Loecker et al. (2012) for more details on the impact of unobserved output and
input prices, respectively.
Third, the selection and simultaneity biases understate the productivity advantages of minimills.
Attenuation bias lowers the estimated returns to scale. Since VI plants are larger than minimills, this
will make VI plants look more productive than they really are. Likewise, simultaneity typically re-
sults in a downward bias on the capital coefficient. Indeed, the estimated capital coefficient is 0.050 in
Column II (OLS), while it increases by 60 percent, to 0.079, in Column I (GMM) once we correct for
simultaneity and selection. Since VI plants are more capital-intensive than minimills, this will again
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make VI plants appear more productive.27 In all the subsequent analysis, we rely on estimates of pro-
ductivity, ωit, from Column I of Table 4. We also show all our main results using various specifications
discussed in Table 4 to give an idea of how differences in specifications of the production function spill
over into the subsequent analysis.
Technology does not explain all the differences in productivity, as the standard deviation of ωit is
about 30 percent, while differences in technology account for an eight percent gap in productivity. Thus,
there remain substantial productivity differences between producers, both within and across technology
types. This finding sits well with recent evidence on the dispersion of productivity across producers in
narrowly defined industries. See Syverson (2011) for a recent survey.
We have exclusively compared plants of different technology along one dimension: total factor
productivity. While there are good reasons to focus on this variable, it is equally interesting and im-
portant to consider different measures of firm performance. While in most applications, estimates of
productivity (ωit) and direct measures of profitability will be very similar due to the fact that output
and input prices are included in the productivity residual, they can be quite different in our setting.28
As already discussed in section 3.2, minimills are also superior in other measures of performance
such as profit margins and the rate of return on capital.29
4.2 Alternative productivity drivers
In this section, we explore various potential alternative drivers of productivity growth in the steel indus-
try. The goal of this section is not to rule out these alternate mechanisms. We simply wish to show that
our technology mechanism is unaffected by controlling for the following alternatives: Firm-level char-
acteristics, geography, and international trade do not appear to play a role in explaining the differences
in productivity between minimills and vertically integrated producers.
4.2.1 Management practices and ownership
Our analysis, thus far, has been focused on plants. To the extent that better plants are managed by
better firms, we have, so far, attributed productivity differences across plants to technology, rather
than to better management – that is that more-productive plants, regardless which technology they
use, are better-managed, or belong to more efficiently organized firms. The potential role for firm-
27A capital coefficient of 0.079 is not exceptional for a gross-output production function. For some validation of this
coefficient, it is useful to remark that the sum of the material and labor share is 0.88. Under the assumptions that underlie the
first-order approach to the estimation of production functions, this would imply a capital coefficient of 0.12 under constant
returns to scale, and a smaller coefficient on capital if there is any market power. Note, as well, that increasing the capital
coefficient would lead to finding an even larger for role for reallocation towards minimills since vertically integrated mills are
more capital-intensive, so increasing the capital coefficient makes these appear less productive.
28See De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) on how exactly they relate to each other.
29In addition, we also checked whether exit relates to the plant’s profitability. To do this, we ran regressions of exit in a
five-year window – i.e., plant exit in 1992 given that the plant was active in 1987, on profitability, capital, an indicator on
whether a plant is vertically integrated, and year controls. The marginal effects of this regression are presented in Table B.5.
We find that more profitable-plants, measured either by rate of return or profit margin, are less likely to exit.
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level variables to explain productivity differences is plausible, given the recent findings of Bloom and
Van Reenen (2010). They present empirical evidence that measures of productivity, like the one we use,
are correlated with various management practices, reflecting human resource (HR) practices and orga-
nizational design. Likewise, Ichniowski et al. (1997), using detailed data on rolling lines at U.S. steel
mills, find that better HR practices lead to higher productivity. Their results confirm recent theoretical
models that stress the importance of complementarities among work practices.
To check whether the minimill premium in our sample period is driven by better-managed firms, or
by any particular kind of firm-specific ownership structure, we compare minimills to VI plants within
the same firm, and time period, by regressing productivity on technology, and a firm-year fixed effect.
Table 5 presents the results. We start out in Column I with a base premium of 7.4 percent without firm
fixed-effects. We find an almost identical productivity premium for minimills, of 8.4 percent, when
including a firm-year fixed effect (Column II). These results suggest that the minimill productivity
premium was not driven by a particular allocation of minimill plants to more-productive firms with,
say, better management or human resource (HR) practices.30
Finally, including firm fixed effects does not rule out an effect of management. If management
practices differ between plants at the same firm, and these intra-firm differences in management are
precisely aligned with the technology used in production, then we could still attribute management
effects to minimills. However, while we think that this story is improbable, it would take historical
plant-level data on management to rule it out, and, the Census data during our sample period do not
track this type of information.31
4.2.2 Geography
Although steel production has historically been concentrated in a few regions in the U.S., there is still
considerable variation in activity across regions. In 2002, 63 percent of steel was produced in the
Midwest – i.e., Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania – while this figure was 75 percent
in 1963. We check whether regional patterns influence our results by incorporating a full set of state-
year dummies, in a regression of productivity on our measure of technology. Column III, in Table
5 shows that the substantial minimill premium is largely unaffected when including state-time fixed
30Our results do not contradict those presented by Ichniowski et al. (1997), who rely on a sample of 17 rolling mills
collocated with vertically integrated plants in the United States and, therefore, omit minimills from the analysis. Thus, there
is no information on the relative performance of minimills. Moreover, the size of the productivity effects (in gross-output
terms) found in Ichniowski et al. (1997) are equivalent to between 2.7 and 3.5 percent. See Table B.6 for more details on
these calculations.
31The new wave of economic Census will contain a Management and Organization Practices Survey (MOPS). See World
Management Survey and http://bhs.econ/census.gov/bhs/mops/ for more on this recent addition. Unfortu-
nately, in our sample, 1963-2002, the MOPS survey did not exist. Therefore, we cannot empirically test the role of man-
agement directly in the data that are readily available. MOPS is now part of the 2010 ASM, which would allow for only a
cross-sectional comparison of, say, minimills to integrated plants. Whether or not there were any differences in management
practices across technologies in 2002, it would not help separate out the impact of the entry of minimills on industry aggregate
productivity growth, over the period 1963-2002. However, Bloom et al. (2013a), specifically in footnote 9, find that in the
MOPS data, firm fixed-effects absorb only about half of cross-plant variation in management. This means that much, but not
all, of the variation in management is common across plants within the same firm.
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effects. This result reflects that minimills are, on average, 10.2 percent more productive than integrated
producers in the same state and year (Column III). Furthermore, this result is robust with respect to
including technology-year interactions.
Finally, in Column IV, we include a joint firm-state-year fixed effect and find that the technology
premium is still strongly positive and significant, but with a point estimate of 18 percent.32 This sug-
gests that minimills are vastly more productive, even when we compare a minimill and a vertically
integrated plant owned by the same firm, and located in the same state. The results in Table 5 indicate
that the productivity premium for minimills is robust, and is not an artifact of a particular selection
mechanism that operates at the firm or regional level.
4.2.3 International Trade
Over the last four decades, the U.S. steel sector has faced stronger competition from foreign producers.
For our purposes, the relevant question is whether the mere increase in import competition could explain
the rapid productivity growth in the industry.
Table 6 lists the change in imports and import penetration rate across the U.S. manufacturing in-
dustries (4-digit SIC codes) and compares these with those for the steel industry. The upper panel lists
the total imports and shows that the steel sector’s imports increased by four percent, versus 66 per-
cent for the average manufacturing industry. The bottom panel reports the import penetration ratio and
highlights that international competition increased across all U.S. manufacturing industries; steel was
no exception. Yet there was a slower increase in international competition for the steel industry relative
to most sectors in manufacturing, with the import penetration ratio increasing by eight percent in steel
versus 15 percent for the rest of manufacturing. However, productivity growth in the steel industry,
as shown in Table 1, was well above the average for manufacturing. Thus, it is not the case that the
exceptional productivity growth in steel was contemporaneous with an exceptional increase in import
competition for steel producers.
We examine the statistical relationship between productivity growth and the change in the import
penetration ratio over the period 1972-1996. Specifically, we run the following regression: ∆ΩI =
γ0 + γ1∆import penetrationI + νI across the entire sample of four-digit SIC87 industries I , where ∆
is the difference over the 1972-1996 period, and we weigh observations by the industry’s share in total
manufacturing production. Table B.7 in the Online Appendix presents the results of these regressions
in detail. This regression predicts only an eight-percent increase in productivity in the steel industry,
given the steel industry’s increase in import penetration.33 Put differently: The change in international
competition can explain, at most, one third of the productivity growth.34
32About nine percent of firms own both minimills and vertically integrated plants, and these firms produce 43 percent of
output in the industry.
33We construct a matched production-trade database at the four-digit SIC87 level using the NBER Manufacturing Database
and the U.S. Trade Database.
34 These types of estimates are further subject to various biases and measurement problems. Identifying the impact of
foreign competition on industry performance is further complicated by endogenous changes in international competition, as
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One might worry that the effects of international competition were more pronounced for vertically
integrated producers than for minimills, thus affecting the interpretation of our results. Therefore,
we look at whether import shares differed across products. As discussed previously, minimills were
primarily active in the bar segment, while vertically integrated producers produced both bar and sheet
products. When we break down imports and exports by product, we find that imports show a rise for
bar products produced by minimills that is similar to that of sheet products, which minimills do not
produce.
In addition, since vertically integrated producers were historically more concentrated in the mid-
west, while minimills were more evenly distributed across the country, including in coastal areas, we
might worry that vertically integrated plants were more insulated from foreign competition. However,
in the previous subsection, we showed that the productivity advantage of minimills is robust to control-
ling for regional differences in the form of state fixed-effects.
4.2.4 Unions
One might also be concerned that differences in the performance of minimills and vertically integrated
producers were due not to technology, but to higher unionization rates at vertically integrated producers.
We address this issue in several ways.
First, much of the variation in unionization between minimills and vertically integrated plants stems
from geographic differences in state laws on unionization. In particular, many states in the south of the
United States have “right to work” laws that make it difficult for workers at a plant to form a union.
However, our previous work in Subsection 4.2.2 found that controlling for geography had no bearing
on the measured productivity advantages of minimills.35
Delving deeper into controls for unionization, in our reading of discussions of unionization, a firm’s
workers are usually either unionized or not unionized across all of its plants within the state. Column
IV of Table 5 runs regressions of plant-level productivity on the technology dummy and firm-state-year
fixed-effects.36 Thus, we control for any productivity difference that might exist between states and
time and within the firm. We find that the productivity premium for minimills is somewhat higher, at
18 percent, when we look for productivity differences within the firm and state.
Second, we go beyond the simple notion of such a control, and we rely on data on union member-
ship rates from 1983 to 2002, with the information broken down either by state, or by industry. Table
B.8 in the Online Appendix lists the rates for the steel industry and compares it to the average for all of
manufacturing. We find that steel unionization intensity – as measured by the membership rate – fell by
well as by reversed causality from productivity growth to international trade.
35Another way to refine this is to focus on those states in which unionization rates are very low. However, state and year
controls are the most important factor in explaining the unionization rate in a state-year panel data. The R2 of the union
membership rate on state and year dummies (separately of course) is 87%.
36The only direct evidence we found is by Arthur (1999), who mentions that about 50 percent of minimill workers are
unionized. So even among minimills, half of the workers are unionized, which further strengthens our hypothesis that
variation in unionization is not a clear driver for the productivity premium.
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exactly the same rate as the average in all of manufacturing. Therefore, we invoke the same logic as in
the (aggregate) import case: The unionization rate cannot explain the differential productivity growth
for steel compared to the average for the manufacturing sector as a whole.37
Third, we find it useful to revisit the existing literature on unions and productivity. Schmitz (2005)
finds evidence that unions have a strongly detrimental impact on productivity in the iron-ore industry.
However, other studies, such as Clark (1980)’s study of the cement industry, find productivity improve-
ments due to unions. To parse throughout the industry-level evidence on the impact of unions, a nice
collection of studies is Medoff and Freeman (1984), who find few positive or negative effects of unions
on productivity. Our findings are, therefore, not inconsistent with the broader literature.38
4.2.5 Distinguishing between competing forces
We have put forward evidence of a robust productivity premium for the new technology (minimills).
However, this does not rule that other factors, such as those discussed above, can simultaneously op-
erate and lead to additional productivity gains. More specifically, in the case of imports and unions,
we showed that, quantitatively, the steel industry’s experience in import and unionization rates is not
dissimilar from the average for U.S. manufacturing, while its TFP growth is exceptional.
However, this does not imply that the increase of imports, and its associated import threat, and
decreased unionization, had no role in shaping overall manufacturing productivity. Of course, for
example the mere threat of imports of steel products may have induced the expansion of minimills and
the associated (within-plant) productivity growth, which is something we cannot control for. Just as for
unions, we cannot control for (unobserved) plant-level impacts of unions beyond what we see in output
and input data. However, this will not impact the reallocation excercise, and it will at most affect the
interpretation of the within-plant improvement component. We discuss this distinction in Section 5.
Previewing our decomposition, we think that it is useful to distinguish the impact of these industry-
wide effects from the differences in productivity across technology. In this paper, though we focus on
the latter, we do not rule out the possibility of additional drivers of productivity growth.
Our ultimate aim is to explain the change in aggregate productivity. The distinction between plant-
level regressions and aggregate productivity is particularly important in how we think these other fac-
tors could potentially plague our analysis. The next section deals precisely with the issue of separating
the various channels – i.e., distinguishing between within-plant improvement and reallocation across
plants. Our results so far indicate that, at a minimum, there is a potential for the arrival of minimills to
impact aggregate productivity due to their superior efficiency.
37A summary of our argument is in Figure B.1 in the Online Appendix, where we plot the initial union membership rate (for
1983) against that of 2002. The size of the circle is the employment weight of a sector in total manufacturing employment.
We insert both the 45 degree line and the line of best fit. The steel industry is indicated in the full grey circle, and it lies
exactly on the line-of-best fit. This, together with the fact that steel’s aggregate productivity growth is an order of magnitude
bigger than the median manufacturing sector, leaves little scope for the union story.
38The main obstacles for doing an analysis of the role of unions with micro data in the steel industry, or any industry for
this matter, are summarized by Lee and Mas (2012).
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5 The Role of Reallocation
We rely on our productivity estimates to verify the importance of reallocation, both across and within
technologies, in productivity growth. We consider both static and dynamic decompositions, which
enables us to investigate the importance of entry and exit in productivity growth. We relate a direct
measure of competition – markups – to the reallocation analysis by connecting markups to the analysis
of reallocation, which relates market shares to productivity. Finally, we provide some indications of
the likely welfare effects of the arrival of minimills.
Following Olley and Pakes (1996), we consider industry-wide aggregate productivity (Ω), the mar-
ket share (denoted by sit) weighted average of productivity ωit. In particular, we rely on the following
definition of aggregate productivity: Ωt ≡
∑
i sitωit, which is different from the unweighted average
of productivity ωit ≡ 1Nt
∑
i ωit.
5.1 Static Analysis: introducing a between-technology covariance
In recent work, Bartelsman et al. (2009) discuss the usefulness of the Olley and Pakes decomposition
methodology. They highlight that the positive covariance between firm size and productivity is a robust
prediction of recent models of producer-level heterogeneity, such as Melitz (2003). We follow the
standard decomposition of this aggregate productivity term (also referred to as the OP decomposition)
into unweighted average productivity and the covariance between productivity and market share.
Definition Olley-Pakes Decomposition
Ωt = ωt +
∑
i
(ωit − ωt)(sit − st) = ωt + ΓOPt , (13)
where ΓOPt is the Olley-Pakes Covariance.
The same decomposition can be applied by technology type ψ – i.e., treating MM and VI producers
as if they belong to separate industries – and this decomposition will help us understand whether the
average productivity of the different technology types evolved differently, and whether there is any sub-
stantial reallocation across producers of the same vintage. We call this the within decomposition. The
market share of each technology is denoted s(ψ)t =
∑
i∈ψ sit. Likewise, the type-specific aggregate
productivity is Ωt(ψ), while the average productivity within a technology type is ω¯t(ψ).
Definition Within-Technology Decomposition
Ωt =
∑
ψ∈MM,V I
st(ψ)
ωt(ψ) +∑
i∈ψ
(ωit − ωt(ψ))(sit(ψ)− st(ψ))

=
∑
ψ∈MM,V I
st(ψ)
(
ωt(ψ) + Γ
OP
t (ψ)
)
.
(14)
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This within decomposition reflects both the change in the actual type-specific component, the un-
weighted average and the covariance term, as well as the type-specific market share.
To measure the importance of reallocation of resources between technologies, we interact the pro-
ductivity index with the type-specific market share, st(ψ). We apply the same type of decomposition,
but now the unit of observation is a type; hence, one can think of two plants, an aggregate minimill
and an aggregate vertically integrated producer. This allows us to isolate the between-type realloca-
tion component in aggregate productivity. Denote as Ωt = 12
∑
ψ Ω(ψ)t the industry productivity if
minimills and vertically integrated producers have the same market share – i.e., akin to the unweighted
average of both technologies, we obtain:
Definition Between Technology Decomposition
Ωt = Ωt +
∑
ψ∈MM,V I
(st(ψ)− 1/2)(Ωt(ψ)− Ωt) = Ωt + ΓBt , (15)
where ΓBt is the “Between Covariance” measuring the extent to which the resource reallocation to-
wards minimills contributed to the aggregate productivity for the entire industry. Note that since the
average market share is always one half, when the market share of minimills equals the market share of
vertically integrated producers, the between covariance term ΓBt is zero, regardless of the productivity
difference between the two types.39
Finally, we can group the within-technology and the between-technology decomposition together
to explain aggregate TFP:
Ωt =
1
2
∑
ψ∈MM,V I
[ω¯t(ψ) + Γ
OP
t (ψ)] + Γ
B
t . (16)
Note that equation (16) allows us to explain changes in productivity, through i) changes in the
average productivity of minimills and vertically integrated plants (ω¯t(ψ)); ii) changes in the covariance
between output and productivity for both MM and VI plants (ΓOPt (ψ)); or iii) reallocation across
technologies (ΓBt ).
5.2 Static reallocation analysis: results
Table 7 shows the various cross-sectional decompositions of aggregate productivity – Olley-Pakes,
Between, and Within – looking at their change from 1963 to 2002.
Three important results emerge. First, the Olley-Pakes decomposition of aggregate productivity
across all plants shows that the average producer became 15.7-percent more productive between 1963
and 2002. In addition, the reallocation towards more-productive plants was an important process in
39Given the substantial entry of minimills that typically entered on a smaller scale and remained smaller, we can expect the
covariance term to be negative –i.e., the more-productive plants have a smaller market share. But we do expect this covariance
term to become less negative over time, as Figure 2 shows that minimills started with a very small market share and gradually
captured a larger part of the market.
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increasing productivity, generating a 6.4-percent increase from 1963 to 2002. Thus, aggregate produc-
tivity went up by 22 percent, of which one third was due to the reallocation towards more-productive
plants. This indicates that reshuffling of market shares across producers was an important mechanism
through which the industry realized productivity gains.
Second, we find a large role for the between-technology reallocation component (ΓB). In 1963,
the between covariance was -6.6 percent, as the older vintage of VI plants had both lower productivity
and greater market share. The between covariance ΓB then became less negative as the minimills,
which have a productivity premium, gradually increased their market share. Towards the end of the
sample period, minimills had about half of the market, which mechanically implies a zero between
reallocation component. This between reallocation of output from VI plants to MMs accounts for a
5.1-percent increase in productivity, 23 percent of the overall productivity growth of the industry. The
fact that the arrival of a new production technology can account for changes in the covariance term is
critical since this suggests an important role for technology in explaining the reallocation that led to a
sharp increase in productivity.
Third, drilling down to the technology type, we see that minimills increased their aggregate TFP
(Ω(MM)) by ten percent, while vertically integrated plants raised their aggregate TFP (Ω(V I)) by
24 percent. Interestingly, the reason that vertically integrated producers caught up with minimills is
not changes in the Olley-Pakes covariance term ΓOPt (ψ), whose contribution to productivity growth
was 3.7 percent for minimills and 4.4 percent for vertically integrated producers. Rather, it was the
much higher increase in average plant productivity for vertically integrated producers (ωit(V I)) of
18.4 percent, versus a ωit(MM) of 5.4 percent for minimills.
So far, our analysis points to a large impact of minimill entry on shaping overall industry produc-
tivity. We find that about 44 percent of total aggregate productivity growth can be directly attributed to
minimills, with 23 percent due to reallocation away from the old technology and the remaining 21 per-
cent due to productivity improvements at minimill plants, which captures productivity improvements
across all minimills, such as learning by doing and technological change.40
5.3 Dynamics: the role of entry and exit
The above decomposition masks the potential impact of entry and exit on aggregate productivity. The
average productivity term ω mixes changes in productivity inside plants, with changes in the distribu-
tion of productivity due to entry and exit. A similar concern also affects the measured covariance terms.
We turn to this and consider a dynamic version of our decomposition. Let us consider three distinct sets
of producers for a given time window t− 1, t, where t is a ten-year window: incumbents (A), entrants
40We do not pursue an explicit analysis of the learning-by-doing effects at minimills, since our data do not contain the level
of detail needed for us to credibly infer this process. See Benkard (2000) for such an analysis, and what type of data are key
to identifying learning by doing. Our data do suggest that there is no substantial vintage-effect for minimills. The dynamic
decompositions will shed more light on this dimension.
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(B) and exiting plants (C).41 Using these sets, we can write aggregate productivity growth, ∆Ωt, as:∑
i∈A
sit−1∆ωit︸ ︷︷ ︸
Plant Improvement
+
∑
i∈A
∆sitωit−1 +
∑
i∈A
∆sit∆ωit︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reallocation
+
∑
i∈B
sitωit︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry
−
∑
i∈C
sit−1ωit−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exit
. (17)
The first term is denoted Plant Improvement; the next two on are the Reallocation term, and the
last two terms are the Entry and Exit components. The above decomposition directly isolates the net-
entry effect on aggregate productivity by verifying the importance of the last two components in total
productivity growth. Finally, to isolate the role of entry and exit for each types of technology, we
expand the above by computing equation (17) by technology type ψ. When we refer to the total impact
of reallocation, we group all terms except for the plant-improvement component.
Table 8 presents the decomposition across all plants and by technology.42 The first row restates
the 22-percent productivity growth in the U.S. steel sector, but finds far faster growth for vertically
integrated plants than for minimills.
Across the entire sample period, over which productivity increased by 22 percent, the plant im-
provement component accounted for a 9.5-percent increase in aggregate productivity (or a 43-percent
share), while reallocation and net entry are responsible for the remainder. Thus, the total share of re-
allocation in aggregate productivity growth, including both the reallocation induced by market-share
reallocation across incumbents and the net-entry process, is two-thirds.
A clear picture emerges when we move to the decomposition by technology. The main driver of
productivity growth for minimills is the plant improvement component of 11.8 percent, capturing the
technological change in minimills. This is suggestive of the substantial learning by doing that took
place in minimill production– in particular, learning how to produce higher-quality steel – over the
sample period. The reallocation component is negligible.
The same analysis of VI producers yields substantially different results: The plant improvement
component, of 9.3 percent, is smaller than that of minimills (11.8 percent), and the net entry term of 3.8
percent is almost 17 percent of total industry productivity growth over the sample. Most noteworthy
is that the reallocation term of 11.3 percent is responsible for 23 percent of industry-wide productivity
growth.
In the last row of Table 8, we restate the distinct role of the net-entry process across technologies.
We present the productivity premium of entrants, compared to the set of exiting plants. Across the
entire sample period, VI entrants were 4.4-percent more productive than those VI plants that exited the
industry. New minimills, on the other hand, entered with no specific productivity advantage.
To summarize, we find a drastic difference in the role of reallocation between technologies. The
productivity growth of minimills was entirely due to common within-plant productivity growth, whereas
41This decomposition has been suggested by Davis et al. (1996) and has been used in other empirical work, such as De
Loecker and Konings (2006).
42We also analyzed the changes over a ten-year period. Due to Census disclosure rules, we cannot present for shorter time
windows, and the results are very similar.
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integrated producers’ productivity growth came from the reallocation of resources across producers. In
the next section, we focus on the role of reallocation among vertically integrated producers, which was
a key driver of productivity growth among producers relying on the old technology, and consequently,
triggered productivity growth for the industry as a whole.
5.4 Catching up of the old technology
So far, we have shown that a substantial part of the industry’s productivity growth can be accounted
for by the arrival of the new technology and its own technological progress, capturing about half of
the productivity growth in the industry. The entry of the new technology, however, spurred a dramatic
reallocation process in the incumbent technology, leading to a sharp increase in productivity– where the
exit margin played a key role. It is, therefore, natural to ask how incumbents became more productive.
From our various decompositions, we already know that the exit of inefficient producers was a key
driver, in addition to the reallocation among existing producers.
To uncover the underlying mechanism, we incorporate the product space of the industry. We know
from Figure 3 that the market-share trajectories of minimills for, broadly speaking, two product cate-
gories – bar products and sheet products – were very different. Indeed, minimills took over bar prod-
ucts, but not sheet products. Therefore, we verify whether the substantial productivity gains among
(surviving) VI producers over our sample period were related to the product-market competition – i.e.,
did VI producers of bar products exit, leaving only those VI producers specializing in sheet products?
In other words: How important was increased competition, due to minimill entry, for incumbents’s
productive efficiency?
The distinction between the two product groups is relevant to the extent that (1) there exists a
productivity difference between bar producers and sheet producers, and (2) survival is related to spe-
cialization. A potential third component would be the change in product specialization at the plant level
over time. However, we find very little change in product specialization over time, which we discuss
in more detail in Online Appendix F; thus, this mechanism cannot generate within-plant productivity
improvements.
In order to verify whether this mechanism is important in the data, we first test whether plants spe-
cializing in sheet products were, on average, more productive, than those specializing in bar products.
Subsequently, we ask whether the product specialization variable predicts plant survival. We run both
tests on the total sample of plants in our data, and on the subsample of VI producers. In the latter, we
compare plants of the same technology and verify whether product specialization can explain the rapid
productivity growth among the group of VI producers.
Table 9 estimates both a technology and sheet-specialization productivity premium for a number of
specifications, where sheet specialization refers to the share of a plant’s revenue accounted for by sheet
products.43 In Panel A, we consider all plants in the industry, and while controlling for technology
43For all practical purposes, minimills do not produce sheet products. Moreover, there is little year-to-year variation in the
share of revenues accounted for by sheet products within a plant as discussed in Online Appendix F. This suggests that it is
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and an exhaustive set of fixed effects, find a robust and significant productivity advantage for plants
specializing in sheet products. Even if we compare plants of the same technology, within the same
firm and in the same year in Column IV, we find a 12-percent productivity premium for plants that
completely specialized in sheet. In Panel B, we focus on the VI producers, and find a similar premium.
These results, therefore, suggest that the rapid productivity growth of VI producers was due to the
reallocation from bar to sheet producers. The latter is consistent with the market-share trajectories
presented in Figure 3, which showed MM taking over bar products but not sheet products.
Taking the sheet productivity premium as given, we verify whether VI producers producing pri-
marily sheet products had a higher likelihood of survival. In Table 10, we present survival regressions,
where we run an indicator of plant survival – whether a plant that was in active in 1963, survived until
2002 – against plant technology and sheet specialization.44 In Panel A, we consider all plants in the
industry and find that the sheet specialization ratio variable has a strong positive impact on a plant’s
survival probability, holding fixed its technology. Indeed, a plant that was fully specialized in sheet had
a 31-percent-higher probability of surviving than a plant that was fully specialized in bar. This is a very
large effect, as plants have a 33-percent likelihood of survival to begin with. Moreover, this effect is
robust to controlling for the plant’s capital and productivity– standard predictors of plant survival.45
The productivity difference between sheet and bar producers is relevant only to the extent that it
exists among integrated producers. In Panel B, we focus on VI producers and find a very similar effect:
VI producers specializing in sheet products in 1963 had a 31-percent-higher probability of surviving to
the year 2002. We note that predicting plant survival over a 40-year period is a very demanding task.
Even when our sample size is reduced to 78 VI producers active in 1963, we obtain a t-statistic of 1.6
on the sheet-specialization variable, while controlling for capital and productivity.
Thus, the joint productivity and survival premium for sheet producers help explain the overall pro-
ductivity growth of VI producers in the aftermath of minimill entry. Minimills increased competition
in the bar market, leading to the exit of inefficient VI producers. As a consequence, the set of remain-
ing VI producers was more productive due to an increased concentration in the sheet product market.
This mechanism, therefore, manifests itself in substantially higher productivity of VI producers and a
dramatic drop of VI’s market share of bar products. In light of our decomposition results, presented
in Tables 7 and 8, 30 percent of the industry’s productivity growth was due to the reallocation process
among VI producers, in which the specialization in sheet products seems to have played a crucial role.
To obtain the 30-percent contribution, we sum the role of net-entry (0.07) and reallocation (0.23), in as
listed in Table 8.
Finally, the only component we have not explained is the pure within-plant productivity growth
component for VI producers, which, according to our results in Table 8, accounted for only 19 percent
difficult to alter the product mix at the plant level. Given the lack of within-plant variation in sheet specialization, regressions
with plant-level fixed effects will have little power to identify the productivity premium of sheet producers.
44These results are robust to looking at survival from 1967, 1972 or even 1977, until 2002. Likewise, these results are also
robust to looking at survival until 1997 and 1992.
45See Collard-Wexler (2009) and the references therein.
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of aggregate TFP growth. This common shift of the production frontier for VI producers captures
the direct technological innovations in steel making at integrated plants due to active investments, and
improvements in technical efficiency. However, this leaves 81 percent of total productivity growth that
can be attributed to the reallocation induced by minimill entry, as well as increasing productivity at
minimills.
The fact that we cannot explain all productivity growth by the expansion of minimills is not surpris-
ing. We expect that 40-years of innovation in the engineering and management of vertically integrated
plants led to increased productivity. Alternative drivers of productivity – such as management, imports
and unions – are likely reasons for this within-plant improvement component. While it would be con-
ceptually straightforward to regress ω¯t(ψ) against either measures of import penetration or unionization
rates, this presents some practical challenges. In order to credibly identify the impact of such factors
on (within-plant) productivity growth, we need to rely on exogenous variation across plants and time;
therefore, this requires having either plant-level or industry-wide instruments.46
5.5 Market Power
The drop in demand for U.S. steel producers and the variation in the market-shares trajectories across
products point to drastic changes in competition in the steel market. We argued that the entry of the
minimill intensified competition for domestic steel producers, in particular for the bar segment of the
industry (see Section 3.2). In addition to this increased domestic competition, it is well known that
international competition intensified through a substantial increase of imports. The increased compe-
tition is expected to have affected a plant’s residual demand curve and, therefore, to impact its ability
to charge a price above marginal cost. The change in the residual demand elasticity, and its associated
markup response, are expected to have affected the reallocation across producers, as well.
We rely on the framework of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) to: (1) show that markups in-
deed decreased as competition increased; and (2) show how lower markups are directly related to our
measure of reallocation, the covariance of productivity and a plant’s market share.
A nice feature of this approach is that we can generate measures of market power from our estimates
of the production function. We rely on our production function framework to recover markups by
technology type and plant. The core assumptions are that plants minimize costs, and at least one input
is variable. Online Appendix D.2 presents the details of this approach.
The two ingredients for computing markups are the output elasticity of intermediate inputs, such
as materials and energy, and the corresponding expenditure share of the input. The latter is directly
observed in the data, whereas the output elasticities are recovered from our estimates of the production
function β in section 4.1.3.
We compute markups (µ) by technology as obtained from technology-specific aggregate expen-
ditures on materials (Et(ψ) ≡
∑
i∈ψ p
M
it Mit) and sales (Rt(ψ)), while relying on a time-invariant
46For some recent work trying to tease out such an effect, see De Loecker (2011) and Bloom et al. (2011) on the impact of
trade on productivity, where quota variation is used as a source of exogenous variation in international competition.
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Cobb-Douglas output elasticity of the intermediate input (βm):
µt(ψ) = βm
Rt(ψ)
Et(ψ)
. (18)
For our Cobb-Douglas production function, these markups are the proper technology-specific markups,
where the markup by technology can be thought of as a weighted average markup across plants, and
where the weights are given by the expenditure share on materials of a given plant in the total expendi-
tures for plants using the same technology.47
5.5.1 Markup trajectory
Figure 4 plots the markup trajectory over 40 years for both MM and VI plants. Markups have steadily
decreased over time and are consistent with the drop in prices and external measures of concentration
reported for the steel sector. Markups were, on average, higher for minimills, confirming the results
from the augmented production function estimation in Table 4. This is as expected since they produce
more efficiently while competing in the same product market.
We can pursue the same strategy, and compare average markups across products. This is a par-
ticularly useful exercise since we have stressed the increased competition in the bar product market,
at least up to the mid-1990s. Therefore, we expect that markups fall more in the bar market, as both
the number of minimills and their share of bar output increased. However, in order to produce the
trajectory of markups by product, we would need to estimate the markups for each plant and product.
While this is conceptually straightforward in our framework, it requires recovering the allocation of
input expenditures by product, for each plant. Unless we see fully specialized plants (into one product
only), this is a challenging task.48
While we observe sales by product at the plant level, it is difficult to assign material expenditures to
each of these products unless a plant is fully specialized into a single product. However, since minimills
were almost completely specialized into producing bar products, at least up to the mid-1990s, we can
interpret the markup trajectory of the minimills as representative of the trajectory of markups for bar
products. We find that the average markup of minimills, standing in for bar producers, saw a sharp drop
from 1.8 in 1963 to 1.1 in 2002. The markups for vertically integrated producers, who produce both
bar and sheet products, fell only from 1.4 to about 1.2. We see this aggregate pattern as evidence that
product market competition intensified due to the expansion of minimill production and led to lower
margins, especially in the bar market.
47To see this, use ciψt = EitEt(ψ) in the share weighted markup expression for a type ψ, where ciψt is the share of an
individual plant in the type’s total: µt(ψ) =
∑
i∈ψ ciψtµit =
∑
i∈ψ ciψtβm
Rit
Eit
= βm
Rt(ψ)
Et(ψ)
. The perhaps unattractive
feature of a Cobb-Douglas production technology is that the output elasticities of intermediate inputs are time-invariant.
Figure C.2 shows that the share of expenditures on intermediate inputs in total cost is rather constant across our sample
period.
48See De Loecker et al. (2012)
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5.5.2 Markups and reallocation
Markups fell at the same time that the covariance between output and productivity increased. Suppose
that this fall in markups was due to firms’ residual demand curve becoming more elastic. In other
words, markups fell because the product market for steel became more competitive. This does not
seem unlikely since there were far more steel producers in 2002 than in 1963 competing over a roughly
similar market size.49 A more elastic residual demand curve will accentuate the relationship between
productivity and output. Furthermore, the increase in the residual demand curve for integrated firms is
consistent with the increased competition from minimills, and a resulting decline in their market share.
In the context of variable markups and trade liberalization, by Edmond et al. (2012) and Mayer et al.
(2011) make a similar point. Thus, we expect the extent of competition to be linked to reallocation,
which is the pattern we find in the data.
5.6 Welfare effects
While it is not the main focus of our paper, we can use our estimates of productivity growth, and our
reallocation analysis, to make statements about the welfare effects of the entry of minimills.
We have good estimates of the production function and can, therefore, generate reliable estimates
of the industry’s supply curve. However, we do not have the same level of detailed data to engage in an
econometric analysis of the industry’s demand curve.
With this caveat in mind, we calculate the change in consumer surplus by presenting consumers
in 1963 with 2002 prices. We previously found that, at a minimum, 51 percent of productivity growth
could be attributed to the entry of minimills: 23 percent coming from the between reallocation (Table
7) and 28 percent coming from total minimill productivity growth (Table 8). Thus, we attribute 51
percent of the fall in prices for steel from 1963 to 2002 to minimills. We extrapolate counterfactual
demand under these 2002 prices using various assumptions of the elasticity of demand. Table B.9 in
the Online Appendix presents the consumer surplus gain in 1997 dollars, and the associated share of
this change in consumer surplus over total sales of the industry. We also compute the total change in
consumer surplus due to the fall in prices for steel from 1963 to 2002, irrespective of whether these are
due to minimill entry or some other factors.
Depending on the exact elasticity of demand that we assume, we find that consumer surplus in-
creased by between 17 and 23 billion dollars (in 1997 $) between 1963 and 2002. If we attribute
51 percent of this fall in prices to minimills, then minimills would be responsible for an increase in
consumer surplus of between nine and 11 billion dollars. Put differently, our back-of-the-envelope
calculations suggest that the reallocation towards minimills led to an increase in consumer surplus of
between 13 and 16 percent of shipments in the steel industry.
Of course, this somewhat crude welfare analysis leaves out several important issues, one of which
49Total production in 1965 was about 130 million, and by 2000, it was about 112 million tons (American Iron and Steel
Institute, 2010). Also see Figure 1, which presents the value of production and the number of plants.
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we already mentioned: We hold demand fixed, and impose a specific curvature of the demand curve.
Another omission from this analysis is that over 400,000 workers left the industry, and we do not take
into account the welfare implications of such a major transition.50 A more complete welfare analysis
should address these issues.
6 Robustness Analysis
We present the main results from our decomposition analysis using a variety of productivity estimates
(as presented in Table 4). We discuss the robustness of our results and highlight the importance of our
corrections in establishing a prominent role of technology in generating aggregate productivity growth.
Finally, we consider an alternative measure of aggregate productivity, and its associated decomposition,
which differs in the sense that reallocation can impact aggregate productivity only if the marginal
product of inputs are not equalized across producers.
6.1 Robustness
Tables 11 and 12 present robustness checks on our decompositions of aggregate productivity growth.
For several of the productivity estimates from using the specifications listed in Table 4, we produce
the static and dynamic decompositions. The first column of Tables 11 and 12 rely on productivity es-
timates obtained using the production function coefficients of specification I in Table 4. We contrast
these to results obtained using productivity estimates obtained without correcting for simultaneity and
selection (Column II), and those obtained without correcting for unobserved output and input price dif-
ferences across producers (Columns III and IV). We also include the results using technology-specific
production functions (Column V), as discussed in Section 4.1.3 and presented in Column IV of Table
3.
The various components of the decompositions use plant-level estimates of productivity β, which
rely on estimated production function coefficients and, thus, are also estimates. We use a block boot-
strap routine to produce confidence intervals of the shares of each component. The 95-percent confi-
dence intervals are given in Tables 11 and 12. Note that the main points on reallocation that we have
discussed – such as the importance of the between covariance, the relatively faster growth of vertically
integrated plants relative to minimills, and the more important role of reallocation and net entry for
vertically integrated plants than for minimills – are statistically significantly at the 95-percent level for
our baseline specification in Column I.
50Our data do not track employment out of the steel industry. Data from the LEHD program (Abowd et al., 2004) could
presumably aid in identifying the reallocation of workers in the steel industry to other sectors.
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6.2 Importance of Corrections
Looking across the columns of Tables 11 and 12 shows that to obtain the correct quantitative effects of
the entry of minimills on aggregate productivity, it is import to correct for unobserved productivity and
prices when estimating the production function. What is particularly sensitive to the specification of
the production function is the between decomposition. Indeed, the between component is 23 percent in
Column I, which uses GMM, as opposed to ten percent in Column II, using OLS productivity estimates.
These differences are statistically significant, as the 95-percent confidence intervals for the between
technology share do not overlap. This is unsurprising, as Table 4 showed that the minimill productivity
premium was far larger in Column I (GMM) than in Column II (OLS). These difference in the estimated
productivity advantages of minimills spill over directly to the estimated magnitude of the between
covariance. Likewise, if we had not controlled for plant-specific output prices, as shown by Column
IV, we would have found a between technology share of 18 percent rather than 23 percent, even though
this difference is not statistically significant. Again, the difference in the estimate between technology
share reflects differences in the estimated minimill premium found in Table 4.
The role of entry and exit is altered by not correcting for plant-level prices and productivity errors in
the production function. The impact of the exit process of vertically integrated producers is cut in half
(from 16 to seven percent between Columns I and II), while the within-plant minimill improvements are
underestimated (123 versus 87 percent from Column I to II). Correcting for simultaneity and selection
is crucial to obtain reliable productivity measures and, more importantly, to measure the impact of entry
and exit, an important part of our reallocation mechanism, on aggregate productivity.
Summing up, if we incorrectly ignored price variation across producers, the endogeneity of inputs,
and the non-random exit of plants in the data, we would underestimate the reallocation mechanism by
a factor of two. Our results suggest that the total effect of minimill entry on industry-wide productivity
growth was 81 percent. This share drops somewhat when ignoring unobserved price and productivity
heterogeneity. However, although we find a much larger magnitude, the role of technology is present
even when using uncorrected productivity estimates, which adds to the robustness of the importance of
our specific reallocation mechanism.
Allowing for technology-specific output elasticities, as shown in Column V, leads to virtually iden-
tical estimates of productivity growth and reallocation to those in Column I, which assume identical
output elasticities across the two technologies. However, the 95-percent confidence interval around
the various components is far larger in Column V than in Column I. This is to be expected given the
insignificant interaction terms between inputs and the vertically integrated dummy in Table 3, as well
as the associated loss in power when allowing for a more flexible production function.
6.3 Alternative decompositions
Recent work by Petrin and Levinsohn (2012) (PL hereafter) has highlighted that not all measures of ag-
gregate productivity, and their associated analysis of reallocation, can be mapped into either aggregate
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GDP or welfare. While we are primarily interested in documenting the performance of one industry,
the U.S. steel industry, we do so using an intuitive and frequently used set of decompositions. At the
core of the concerns raised by PL is that the Olley-Pakes style aggregate productivity and the associated
reallocation, do not evaluate the use of inputs at their marginal products. In the extreme case, if the
marginal products of all inputs are equated across plants and, hence, in the absence of any frictions or
wedges between marginal products and input prices, there cannot be any role for reallocating resources
to more-productive plants.
In Appendix G in the Online Appendix we also present measures of productivity growth and re-
allocation using the PL approach. This alternative decomposition leads to larger measured aggregate
productivity gains, but we find that the shares of the within-plant and reallocation components are sim-
ilar in our OP and PL decompositions. Indeed, the difference between OP-style decomposition and the
alternative PL decomposition has been documented in Nishida et al. (2013b,a). However, the resolution
of this dispute is outside the scope of the paper and is left for future research.
7 Conclusion
There is, by now, extensive evidence that reallocation of resources across producers substantially im-
pacts productivity growth. This paper is one of the first to provide a specific mechanism underlying
such reallocation: The entry of a new technology, the minimill, and its associated increased competi-
tion, were largely responsible for the massive productivity growth in the U.S. steel industry.
We provide evidence that technological change can, by itself, bring about a process of resource
reallocation over a long period of time and lead to substantial productivity growth for the industry as
a whole. We find that the introduction of a new production technology spurred productivity growth
through two channels.
First, the entry of minimills led to a slow but steady drop in the market share of the incumbent
technology – the vertically integrated producers. As minimills were 7.5-percent more productive, this
movement of market share between technologies was responsible for a third of the industry’s produc-
tivity growth. Second, the old technology had faster growth in productivity than the new technology,
with TFP growth of 24 percent for vertically integrated producers versus only ten percent for minimills.
This catching-up process of the incumbents came about from a large within reallocation of resources
among vertically integrated plants.
The reallocation among vertically integrated plants was largely due the exit of inefficient producers
active in the low-quality segment (bar products.) On the other hand, minimills’ productivity increased
gradually over time due to a shift in the production function for all minimill producers. Although the
first mimimill producing at a commercial level, entered in the late 1950s, the productivity effects were
long-lasting and still affect the industry’s performance today. In fact, the recent trend in market shares
suggests that minimills have started to enter the high-quality segment of the industry – sheet products
– and taking our results at face value would indicate that more substantial productivity gains can be
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expected.
Our results indicate that the arrival of new technologies can have a major impact on productive
efficiency through increased competition and its associated reallocation of economic resources, leading
to an increase in the industry’s overall performance. It is critical to obtain measures of plant-level
performance and technology to identify this mechanism – i.e., without indicators of technology at the
plant level, we would falsely attribute the productivity gains to other factors correlated with aggregate
productivity, such as international competition, geography, and a variety of firm-level characteristics.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: Relative Performance of the Steel Sector
Steel Sector Mean Sector Median Sector
∆ TFP 28% 7% 3%
∆ Shipments -35% 60% 61%
∆ Labor -80% -5% -1%
∆ Materials -41% 45% 39%
∆ Value Added -43% 34% 38%
∆ Price† -23% -2% -3%
∆ Material Price† -10% -11% -9%
Source: NBER-CES Dataset for SIC Code 3312. Note: Only sectors over 10 billion dollars are in-
cluded. Changes computed between 1972-2002. † Material and Output prices indexes are deflated by
the GDP deflator.
Table 2: Entry and Exit in U.S. Steel
Entrant Market Share (Plants) Exitor Market Share (Plants)
1963-1972 6 (29) 9 (D∗)
1973-1982 5 (49) 20 (20)
1983-1992 21 (55) 18 (47)
1993-2002 12 (30) 2 (41)
Minimills Entrants exiters
1963-1972 17 D∗
1973-1982 39 0
1983-1992 43 26
1993-2002 D∗ 17
Vertically Integrated Entrants exiters
1963-1972 12 D∗
1973-1982 10 20
1983-1992 12 21
1993-2002 D∗ 24
Note: D∗ cannot be disclosed due to the small number of observations. Numbers refer to the revenue
market share represented by exiters and entrants, while numbers in parenthesis refer to the count of
plants that enter or exit.
37
Table 3: Production Functions: Minimills versus Vertically Integrated Plants
OLS GMM
Pooled Tech-specific Pooled Tech-specific
I II III VI
Material 0.608*** 0.614*** 0.680*** 0.657***
(0.034) (0.032) (0.022) (0.026)
Labor 0.335*** 0.306*** 0.274*** 0.261***
(0.028) (0.023) (0.020) (0.022)
Capital 0.043 0.056 0.079*** 0.097***
(0.037) (0.029) (0.016) (0.022)
Material × VI -0.029 0.059
(0.063) (0.047)
Labor × VI 0.072 0.008
(0.049) (0.042)
Capital × VI -0.031 -0.034
(0.023) (0.030)
Year FE X X
R2 0.966 0.966
F-Stat 1663.267 1426.796
Plants 1498 1498 1498 1498
Note: VI is a dummy variable equal to one if a plant is a vertically integrated producer.
Table 6: International Competition: Comparing the Steel Sector to U.S. Manufacturing
Change Total Imports
Period Steel Average Median
% ∆ [72-02] 4.1 66.1 23.7
Import Penetration Rate
Year Steel Average Weighted Average
1972 0.099 0.066 0.055
1996 0.180 0.220 0.157
Change 0.081 0.154 0.102
% Change 81 233 85
Note: The average and weighted average are computed over all available four-digit SIC87 industries using data
provided by the NBER Manufacturing Database (for shipment data) and Bernard et al. (2006) (for import pen-
etration data). The changes are computed by industry before taking averages. The import penetration rate data
are available only up to 1996. Weights are based on the industry’s share of shipments in total manufacturing
shipments as recorded in the NBER Manufacturing Database.
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Table 4: Production Function Coefficients and Technology Premium
Input and Output Price Deflators No Plant-Level Output Price Deflator No Plant-Level Input Price Deflator
GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS
I II III IV V VI
Material 0.680 0.631 0.650 0.610 0.680 0.631
[0.65 0.73] [0.58 0.69] [0.62 0.70] [0.52 0.67] [0.64 0.73] [0.58 0.69]
Labor 0.274 0.327 0.282 0.332 0.273 0.327
[0.24 0.31] [0.28 0.37] [0.24 0.32] [0.29 0.38] [0.24 0.31] [0.28 0.37]
Capital 0.079 0.050 0.082 0.051 0.082 0.050
[0.04 0.11] [-0.01 0.10] [0.05 0.11] [-0.01 0.10] [0.05 0.11] [-0.01 0.10]
VI premium -0.075 -0.018 -0.038 0.013 -0.076 -0.018
[-0.12 -0.04] [-0.04 0.00] [-0.08 0.00] [-0.01 0.03] [-0.12 -0.04] [-0.04 0.00]
Note: 95-percent confidence in parenthesis. GMM indicates that a two-stage investment control func-
tion procedure with a selection adjustment was used. VI premium is calculated by projecting estimated
productivity on an indicator for a vertically integrated plant, along with year dummies. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the plant-level to control for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. For GMM
columns, this clustering is computed via block bootstrap, which, in addition, corrects for the multi-step
nature of the GMM estimator.
Table 5: Technology Premium: Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable : Productivity ω
I II III IV
VI -0.074** -0.084 -0.102*** -0.178*
(0.024) (0.048) (0.020) (0.074)
Fixed Effect
Year X
Year-Firm X
State-Year X
Firm-Year-State X
Observations 1498 1498 1498 1498
Groups 301 914 289 1291
R2 0.052 0.005 0.021 0.027
F 15.220 3.006 25.373 5.730
Note: The standard errors are clustered at the plant-level. VI indicates Vertically Integrated plants.
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Table 7: Static Decompositions of Productivity Growth (Change 1963-2002)
Aggregate TFP ∆Ω 22.1%
Olley-Pakes Decomposition:
Unweighted Average: ∆ω 15.7% (0.71)
Covariance: ∆ΓOP 6.4% (0.29)
Between Decomposition:
Unweighted Average: ∆Ω 17.0 % (0.77)
Between Covariance: ∆ΓB 5.1 % (0.23)
Within Decomposition: Minimills Integrated
Aggregate TFP: ∆Ω(ψ) 9.6% 24.3%
Unweighted Average: ∆ω(ψ) 5.4% (0.55) 18.4% (0.83)
Within Covariance: ∆ΓOP (ψ) 4.4% (0.45) 3.7% (0.17)
Note: The share of each component in the total aggregate productivity growth is listed in parentheses.
Table 8: Dynamic Decomposition of Productivity Growth
Component All Minimill Integrated
Total Change 22.1% 9.6% 24.3%
(0.28) (0.49)
Plant Improvement 9.5% 11.8% 9.3%
(0.34) (0.19)
Reallocation 9.3% -0.3% 11.3%
(-0.03) (0.23)
Net Entry 3.3% -2.0% 3.8%
(-0.03) (0.07)
Entry-Exit Premium 0.0% 4.4%
Note: The share of each component in the total aggregate productivity growth is listed in parentheses.
See equation (17) for definitions of various terms. For example, the share of minimill productivity
growth (9.6%) in aggregate productivity growth is given by: 9.6/17.7×0.77 = 0.28 – i.e., we compute
the share of the minimill productivity growth in the unweighted aggregate productivity growth term,
which we know from the top panel is 0.77.
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Table 9: Sheet Productivity Premium
Dependent Variable: Productivity ω
Panel A: All Plants Panel B: Vertically Integrated
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
Vertically Integrated -0.080*** -0.082*** -0.115*** -0.089* -0.199**
(0.021) (0.024) (0.018) (0.036) (0.077)
Sheet Specialization 0.073* 0.094*** 0.119** 0.078 0.058 0.099** 0.114* 0.168* 0.089
Ratio (0.035) (0.025) (0.036) (0.068) (0.038) (0.032) (0.047) (0.084) (0.079)
Fixed Effects
Year X X X X
State-Year X X
Firm-Year X X
Firm-State-Year X X
Plant X
Observations 1498 1498 1498 1498 1498 667 667 667 667 667
Number of FE 301 301 289 914 129 124 175 353 124 540
R2 0.020 0.082 0.034 0.024 0.033 0.069 0.019 0.019 0.081 0.011
F 14.639 17.167 21.143 7.019 3.537 7.944 9.290 5.980 5.214 1.263
Note: Standard Errors clustered by plant, but not corrected for the sampling error in constructed productivity.
Sheet Specialization Ratio is the share of revenues accounted for by sheet products (hot and cold rolled sheet).
Table 10: Determinants of Exit
Dependent Variable: Plant Exists in 2002
Panel A: All Plants Panel B: Vertically Integrated
I II III IV V
Vertically Integrated -0.36*** -0.39***
(0.09) (0.08)
Sheet Specialization Ratio 0.39** 0.36* 0.31* 0.31* 0.22
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
Log Capital (k) 0.02 0.20 0.24
(0.03) (0.24) (0.25)
Productivity (ω) 0.03 0.05
(0.14) (0.04)
Observations 128 128 78 78 78
Log-Likelihood -73.88 -73.72 -40.36 -40.02 -39.24
χ2 16.97 17.30 5.89 6.58 8.12
Baseline Probability 0.33 0.33 0.23 0.23 0.22
Note: Marginal Effects presented. Dependent variable is whether the plant has not exited by 2002 given
its status in 1963. Very similar results are found with 1972 and 1977 as base years.
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Table 11: Static Decompositions under Alternative Productivity Measures
Baseline OLS No Material Price No Output Price Tech-Specific
Deflator Deflator Production Function
I II III IV V
Change in TFP 22% 28% 22% 23% 19%
[0.17 0.27] [0.23 0.33] [0.16 0.27] [0.18 0.28] [0.01 0.27]
Olley-Pakes
Unweighted Average (∆ω) 71% 69% 71% 77% 65%
[0.59 0.79] [0.62 0.73] [0.60 0.79] [0.68 0.84] [-0.01 0.87]
Covariance (∆ΓOP ) 29% 32% 29% 23% 36%
[0.21 0.41] [0.27 0.38] [0.21 0.41] [0.16 0.32] [0.14 1.01]
Between
Change in Ω 77% 90% 76% 82% 81%
[0.68 0.83] [0.86 0.94] [0.68 0.83] [0.74 0.87] [0.52 2.50]
Change in Between Technology 23% 10% 24% 18% 19%
Covariance (∆ΓB) [0.17 0.32] [0.06 0.14] [0.17 0.33] [0.13 0.26] [-1.50 0.49]
Within Technology
Minimills
Change in TFP 43% 74% 42% 50% 45%
(ratio to aggregate ∆Ω(MM)∆Ω ) [0.19 0.60] [0.59 0.85] [0.18 0.58] [0.29 0.63] [0.02 1.85]
Fraction from Unweighted Average 55% 62% 55% 77% 55%
(∆ω(MM)) [-0.02 0.70] [0.53 0.69] [-0.05 0.70] [0.59 0.86] [-0.05 0.77]
Fraction from Covariance 45% 38% 45% 24% 45%
(∆ΓOP (MM)) [0.31 1.02] [0.31 0.47] [0.30 1.05] [0.14 0.41] [0.23 1.05]
Vertically Integrated
Change in TFP 110% 107% 111% 114% 118%
(ratio to aggregate ∆Ω(V I)∆Ω ) [1.03 1.21] [1.01 1.14] [1.03 1.22] [1.06 1.24] [0.78 3.24]
Fraction from Unweighted Average 83% 76% 84% 89% 87%
(∆ω(V I)) [0.73 0.94] [0.71 0.82] [0.74 0.94] [0.81 0.98] [0.73 1.02]
Fraction from Covariance 17% 24% 17% 11% 13%
(∆ΓOP (V I)) [0.06 0.27] [0.18 0.30] [0.06 0.26] [0.02 0.19] [-0.02 0.27]
Note: GMM refers to the Olley-Pakes control function approach. Plant-level output prices refers to deflating
revenue using product-level price indexes. Plant-level material prices refers to deflating material inputs costs
using material specific price indexes. Bootstrapped 95-percent confidence intervals using 10,000 replications are
shown in brackets, and these include only sampling error in the computation of productivity ω.
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Table 12: Dynamic Decompositions under Alternative Productivity Measures
Baseline OLS No Material Price No Output Price Tech-Specific
Deflator Deflator Production Function
I II III IV V
Dynamic Decomposition
All
Plant Improvement 43% 46% 43% 49% 47%
[0.35 0.49] [0.40 0.50] [0.34 0.49] [0.43 0.53] [0.20 1.15]
Reallocation 42% 42% 42% 40% 43%
[0.35 0.54] [0.37 0.49] [0.35 0.54] [0.33 0.49] [0.30 0.83]
Entry-Exit 15% 12% 15% 11% 10%
[0.12 0.18] [0.11 0.13] [0.12 0.18] [0.08 0.14] -[0.85 0.29]
Minimills
Plant Improvement 123% 87% 125% 136% 124%
[0.94 2.59] [0.77 1.03] [0.94 2.68] [1.07 2.36] [0.88 2.59]
Reallocation -3% 5% -3% -11% 9%
-[0.51 0.09] -[0.03 0.12] -[0.54 0.09] -[0.49 0.01] -[0.56 1.03]
Entry-Exit -21% 8% -22% -25% -34%
-[1.08 0.00] -[0.02 0.14] -[1.18 -0.01] -[0.87 -0.07] -[1.92 0.04]
Vertically Integrated
Plant Improvement 38% 40% 38% 42% 39%
[0.26 0.48] [0.33 0.46] [0.26 0.48] [0.32 0.51] [0.09 0.49]
Reallocation 46% 54% 46% 46% 51%
[0.33 0.61] [0.47 0.61] [0.32 0.61] [0.34 0.59] [0.32 1.15]
Entry-Exit 16% 7% 16% 12% 11%
[0.10 0.22] [0.05 0.09] [0.11 0.22] [0.07 0.17] -[0.35 0.29]
Note: GMM refers to the Olley-Pakes control function approach. Plant-level output prices refers to deflating
revenue using product-level price indexes. Plant-level material prices refers to deflating material inputs costs
using material specific price indexes. Bootstrapped 95-percent confidence intervals using 10,000 replications are
shown in brackets, and these include only sampling error in the computation of productivity ω.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the Steel Industry, and Vertically Integrated Mills and Minimills
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Figure 2: Minimills Market share by Major Product.
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Figure 3: Producer Output and Input Price Indexes
Panel A: Output Price Index by Product Segment
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Note: Producer Price Index for Selected Steel Products deflated by GDP Deflator. Material Price Index
deflated by GDP Deflator. Base year 1987=100. Source: BLS and Authors calculations.
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Figure 4: Market Share Weighted Markups
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
M
ar
ku
p
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
minimill
vi
Source: Own calculations using US Census data.
47
Appendix For Online Publication
A Data Appendix
A.1 Sample Selection
We pull all plants in the Census of Manufacturing, Annual Survey of Manufacturing and Longitudinal
Business Database from 1963 to 2007 coded in either NAICS 33111 or SIC 3312 at some point in their
lives.
The Longitudinal Business Database has worse industry coding than the Census of Manufacturing,
and taking its coding literally introduces a large number of non-steel mills into the sample.51 Therefore,
we include a plant in the sample only if it has been coded in steel in either the CMF or the ASM.
A.2 Coding Minimills, Vertically Integrated, and Rolling Plants
A primary issue in understanding the Steel industry is how to code plants as being minimills, vertically
integrated or rolling and processing plants. For references on the differences between minimills and
vertically integrated plants and the production process for steel, see Fruehan (1998) p.1-12 and Crandall
(1981) p.5-15.
The 2007, 2002 and 1997 Census of Manufacturing have a special inquiry questionnaire for the
steel industry (SI) appended to it. This questionnaire asks plants if they are considered a minimill or
not. Moreover, the SI also asks for plant hours in electric arc furnaces, blast furnaces, coke ovens, and
basic oxygen furnaces. If a plant reports plant hours in coke, blast, or basic oxygen furnace, we flag
this plant as a vertically integrated plant, since vertically integrated plants are defined by the production
process that first produces pig iron and slag, and then processes the result in a basic oxygen furnace. If
a plant reports being a minimill or if it reports hours in an electric arc furnace, then we code this plant
as a minimill.
Some vertically integrated plants occasionally have electric arc furnaces. Whenever a plant report
hours in an electric arc furnace and in a basic oxygen or blast furnace, we assign this plant to the
vertically integrated category. The reason is that the vertically integrated section of the plant is usually
far bigger than the electric furnace section.
Many plants do not report hours in any steel mill department, and do not report being minimills
either. We call these plants rolling mills or processors, as they do not produce steel per se, but process
steel products. For instance, a rolling mill might use steel ingots, blooms and billets (steel shapes), and
roll these into steel sheet. Alternatively, a mill might take steel rods and shape them into steel screws.
For plants that were still in operation in 1997, or were built after 1997, the SI file is all we need to
identify the plant’s type. However, for plants that shut down pre-1997, we use the material and product
trailer to the Census of Manufacturing to classify them.
Minimills can be identified by their input use. Electric arc furnaces use a combination of scrap steel
and direct-reduced iron as inputs. Thus, if a plant uses any direct-reduced iron, we flag this plant as a
minimill. Likewise, if scrap steel represents more than 20 percent of a plant’s material use, we flag this
plant as a minimill.52
Vertically integrated plants can also be identified from their input use. If a plant uses “Coal for
Coke”, this is a good indication that a plant has a blast furnace. We flag rolling mills by their use of
“Steel Shapes and Forms” – steel ingots and so on that are shaped into steel products.
51In particular, the Zip Business Patterns database, that uses the same underlying source as the LBD, has a large number
of entrants coded in NAICS 33111 from 1997 to 2002 that are not steel mills.
52Basic oxygen furnaces at vertically integrated plants also can a take a small percent of scrap steel. For this reason, we
flag a plant as a minimill only if scrap steel is a large part of their inputs.
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We also use the product trailer to categorize plants. If a plant produces “Coke Oven or Blast
Furnace Products”, we flag this plant as vertically integrated. In addition, if a plant produces “Cold
Rolled Sheet Steel” before 1980, we flag this plant as vertically integrated, as minimills only started
producing cold rolled sheets in the mid-80s. For references on the changing ability of minimills to
produce sheet products, see Rogers (2009) on page 162 and chapter 8 of Hall (1997).
Plants are not always consistently coded as either minimills, vertically integrated, or rolling mills
from one year to another. Thus, we classify a plant based on its history of such flags. Specifically, a
plant is vertically integrated if it is flagged as such at least 80 percent of the time. Likewise, a plant is
assigned to the minimill category if it is flagged as such at least 80 percent of the time.
Since vertically integrated plants, as their name suggests, are typically engaged in multiple activ-
ities, such as having an electric arc furnace and a basic oxygen furnace, along with a rolling mill, we
first flag plants as vertically integrated or not, then flag the remaining plants as minimills. Leftover
plants are assigned to be rolling mills.
A.3 Coding Products
We use the product trailer of the Census Bureau to investigate the products produced by steel producers.
We categorize products into the following types which are responsible for 93 percent of output not
categorized as “other” or “unclassified” in 1997: Hot-Rolled Steel Bar: SIC 33124, NAICS 3311117;
Hot Rolled Sheet and Strip: SIC 33123, NAICS 3311115; Cold Rolled Sheet and Strip: SIC 33127,
SIC 33167, NAICS 3312211, NAICS 3312211D; Cold Finished Bars and Bar Shapes: SIC 33128,
SIC 33168, NAICS 3312213, NAICS 331111F; Steel Ingots and Semi-Finished Shapes: SIC 33122,
NAICS 3311113; Steel Wire: SIC 33125, SIC 33155, NAICS 3312225, NAICS 3311119; Steel Pipe
and Tube: SIC 33170, SIC 33177, NAICS 3312100, NAICS 331111B.
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B Additional Tables and Figures
Table B.1: Summary Statistics for Minimills and Vertically Integrated Producers
Vertically Integrated
Mean Std. Dev. Observations
Shipments† 647 671 2,192
Value Added† 261 311 2,192
Cost of Materials† 343 369 2,192
Investment† 36 63 2,192
Assets† 690 860 1,525
Workers 3,062 3,721 2,192
Wage Per Hour 25 8 2,192
Minimills
Mean Std. Dev. Observations
Shipments† 153 178 2,687
Value Added† 61 80 2,687
Cost of Materials† 85 112 2,687
Investment† 7 17 2,687
Assets† 103 139 1,705
Workers 633 750 2,687
Wage Per Hour 25 9 2,687
Note: † In millions of 1997 dollars. The number of observations for total assets is smaller since these
are not part of the ASM after 1992.
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Table B.2: Differences between Minimills and Vertically Integrated Plants
Plant-level characteristic Premium for VI Plants
All 1963 1972 1982 1992 2002
Shipments 1.44 1.60 1.60 1.46 1.32 1.02
(0.08) (0.27) (0.25) (0.23) (0.23) (0.26)
Value Added 1.32 1.43 1.33 1.23 1.31 0.97
(0.09) (0.30) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25) (0.28)
Assets 1.68 2.11 1.88 1.88 1.46 1.17
(0.10) (0.32) (0.29) (0.27) (0.28) (0.31)
Cost of Materials 1.57 1.88 1.74 1.70 1.34 1.04
(0.08) (0.28) (0.25) (0.23) (0.24) (0.26)
Employment 1.24 1.37 1.30 1.32 1.20 0.97
(0.08) (0.26) (0.24) (0.22) (0.22) (0.25)
Shipment per worker 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.14 0.12 0.05
(0.03) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Value Added per worker 0.08 0.06 0.03 -0.09 0.12 0.00
(0.04) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12)
Wage 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.07
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Note: Estimates display the log of the ratio of the mean for VI plants over the mean for MM plants.
Thus, 1.44 in the top left cell indicates that the average vertically integrated plant shipped 144 percent
more than the average minimill or, equivalently, 4.2 times more, while a coefficient of 0 indicates that
VI and MM plants have identical means. Year Controls included in each regression. There are a total
of 1499 observations in these regressions.
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Table B.4: Profit Differences: Minimills versus Vertically Integrated
Dependent Variable Rate of Return on Capital Profit Margin
VI Premium -0.175*** -0.187*** -0.019* -0.040***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.009) (0.009)
Year FE X X
Constant 0.492*** 0.498*** 0.280*** 0.330***
(0.016) (0.039) (0.006) (0.015)
Observations 1355 1355 1355 1355
Note: Median regression presented. Profit Margin is defined as sales minus cost of materials and
salaries over sales (R−p
mM−wL
R ), and Rate of Return on Capital is defined as sales minus cost of
materials and salaries over capital (R−p
mM−wL
K ).
Table B.3: Production by Product
Year HRS HRB CRS Ingots P&T Blast CFB Wire Other
1963 23 23 16 13 7 5 1 2 9
1967 21 23 14 13 7 5 1 2 14
1972 27 23 16 10 6 5 1 2 9
1977 26 22 17 10 8 7 1 1 8
1982 30 21 15 8 11 5 1 1 9
1987 38 20 17 8 5 3 1 1 7
1992 37 21 16 8 5 4 2 1 7
1997 35 21 17 7 6 4 2 1 7
2002 31 22 23 7 6 2 2 2 6
Note: Fraction of Industry Output Accounted for by each product: Hot-rolled steel sheet (HRS), Hot-rolled bar
(HRB), Cold-rolled sheet (CRS), Ingots and shapes, Pipe and tube (P & T), Wire, Cold-finished bars (CFB), and
coke oven and blast furnace products (Blast), Steel Wire (Wire). The one product whose shipments fall notably
over this period is steel ingots and semi-finished shapes (SISS). However, SISS are used primarily in rolling mills
to produce steel sheet and bar. Since the mid 1990’s with the development of slab casting technologies, steel has
been directly shaped into sheets at the mill.
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Table B.5: Exit and Profits
Dependent Variable Exit in Next 5 Years: 14% Probability
Profit Margin -0.159**
(0.052)
Rate Return Capital -0.045**
(0.016)
Productivity -0.059
(0.034)
VI 0.113*** 0.120*** 0.119***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Capital -0.025*** -0.031*** -0.026***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Year FE X X X
Log-Likelihood -407 -407 -410
χ2 135 134 129
Observations 1184 1184 1184
Pseudo-R2 0.142 0.141 0.136
Note: Marginal Effects from a Probit presented.
Table B.6: Comparison of Productivity Results in IPS and CWDL
Paper
IPS 1999 CWDL 2013
Producers 19 Rolling Mills 301 Steel Mills
Years 5 years 1963-2002
Performance Measure Up-Time Gross Output TFP
Main Result 6.7% 30%
Highest estimate of which 2/3 minimill
Note: In order to compare IPS’s findings to ours, we have to convert the 6.7 percent increase in up-time
into a productivity number consistent with our gross-output production function framework. Note that
under a Leontief or value-added production function, up-time is a direct estimate of the productivity
increase (which seems plausible in the setting considered by IPS). To do this in our context we use
the fact that material costs for the integrated mills in our sample are between 50 and 60 percent of
costs. In other words, labor and capital are fixed in the short run (think of increasing capacity from a
20hrs/day to 24 hrs/ day) but materials will increase when capacity utilization goes up, an implication
of an increase in up-time. This implies that productivity increased, due to better HR practice, by 2.7%
and 3.35%. To get at this number we multiply (1 − βm) ∗ 0.067. This number sits very well with our
results on within plant improvements at integrated mills (remember IPS has no minimill in the data).
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Table B.7: Industry Productivity and Foreign Competition
Specification Constant Coefficient Predicted TFP Steel Share of Actual
All 0.07 0.11 0.081 0.34
(Obs: 385) (0.03) (0.13)
Excl SIC=3674 -0.02 1.17 0.079 0.34
(Obs: 384) (0.03) (0.17)
Big Sectors/Excl SIC=3674 -0.10 2.32 0.087 0.37
(Obs: 80) (0.05) (0.17)
Note: We merged the NBER Manufacturing Database with the NBER U.S. Trade Database, using the 4-
digit SIC87 (s) industry classification. We regress the change in aggregate productivity (∆Ω), a long dif-
ference between 1972-1996, on the change in import penetration ratio. In particular we consider ∆Ωs =
γ0 +γ1∆IPRs + νs. All regressions are weighted by the industry’s share in total manufacturing shipments. Big
sectors are defined as having USD 10 BLN or more in total shipments.
Table B.8: Unionization Rates
Year Steel Manufacturing
Union Membership Union Membership
1983 0.60 0.25
1984 0.54 0.23
1985 0.55 0.23
1986 0.56 0.22
1987 0.52 0.21
1988 0.52 0.20
1989 0.51 0.19
1990 0.49 0.20
1991 0.46 0.19
1992 0.49 0.18
1993 0.52 0.18
1994 0.45 0.17
1995 0.46 0.15
1996 0.48 0.16
1997 0.41 0.15
1998 0.40 0.15
1999 0.40 0.15
2000 0.39 0.14
2001 0.40 0.13
2002 0.36 0.13
Note: The data are directly from the CPS database and was downloaded from www.unionstats.
com.
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Table B.9: Welfare effects under various demand elasticities
 = −0.6  = −3.5  = −1
60% Fall in Prices Due to Minimills
Change CS 9.3 Billion $ 11.2 Billion $ 9.5 Billion $
Share Change CS 13% 16% 13%
100% Fall in Prices Due to Minimills
Change CS (All) 17 Billion $ 23 Billion $ 18 Billion $
Share Change CS (All) 24 % 33 % 25 %
Note: The different elasticities of demand are based on 1) an empirical study of U.S. steel by Maasoumi et al.
(2002) , 2) the implied (averaged across time and plants) elasticity of demand from our markup estimates, and
3) an unit-elastic demand curve. Throughout our calculations we assume a linear demand curve. The consumer
surplus is calculated as follows: R63∗ (1−∆(P02, P63)∗ (1/2+1/2∗ (1+∆(P )∗ )) where ∆(P02, P63) =
(1/(1−∆P )) and ∆P = −0.28 ∗ λ, and λ is either 0.6 or 1, depending on the case we consider – i.e., whether
we attribute minimills to 60 percent or 100 percent of aggregate productivity growth. All changes in CS are
reported in 1997 USD.
Figure B.1: Change in Union Membership 1983-2002: Steel and the rest of manufacturing
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Member % in 2002 Fitted values
Note: We plot unionization membership rates of 1983 against those of 2002. Each observation is a
3-digit CIC industry, where the size of circle reflects the size in terms of employment of the industry.
The red is the 45 degree line, while the yellow line indicates the line-of-best fit. The Steel Industry is
represented by a full (green) circle. The data come from CPS (www.unionstats.com).
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C Output and Input Deflators
Recovering productivity using revenue and expenditure data requires that we correct for potential price
variation across plants and time, for both output and inputs. Below, we describe our procedure.
C.1 Output price deflator
In order to guarantee that we recover productivity, ωit, using plant/product revenue data we rely on a
plant-specific output deflator. We construct this deflator using product-level revenues at the plant level
(recorded in the census data) in combination with product-level price data (from the BLS).53
To make sure that price variation – across plants and time – is fully controlled for, we assume
the following structure: Plants charge the same markup across all their products, while markups can
flexibly vary across plants and time. The heterogeneity in markups will naturally arise if plants are
heterogeneous in their underlying productivity.
Before we derive the exact price deflator, we state explicitly what we observe in the data: revenues
(Rijt), input (Xit) and prices (Pjt).
We start out with the following production function:
Qijt = XijtΩit, (C.1)
where we are explicit about productivity only being plant-specific and not plant-product-specific. The
input bundle Xijt contains labor, intermediate inputs and capital, scaled by their corresponding tech-
nology parameters, X = LβlKβkMβm .
Now consider plant-level revenue, which is obtained by summing product-specific revenues, and
using the production function:
Rit =
∑
j
XijtΩitPjt. (C.2)
To recover plant-level productivity from a regression of plant-level (deflated) revenues and input
use, we use:
Xijt ≡ sijtXit (C.3)
Plugging the last expression into the one for plant-level revenue, we get:
Rit = ΩitXit
∑
j
sijtPjt (C.4)
Up to sijt, which we will discuss below, everything is directly observable and, therefore, we can
recover productivity using standard estimation techniques using:
Rit∑
j sijtPjt
= XitΩit (C.5)
or in logs:
53Specifically, we use the following BLS price series: PCU331111331111: Steel; PCU3311113311111: Coke oven and
blast furnace products; PCU3311113311113: Steel ingots and semifinished products; PCU3311113311115: Hot rolled steel
sheet and strip; PCU3311113311117: Hot rolled steel bars, plates, and structural shapes; PCU3311113311119: Steel wire;
PCU331111331111B: Steel pipe and tube; PCU331111331111D: Cold rolled steel sheet and strip and PCU331111331111F:
Cold finished steel bars.
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rit − p˜it = βllit + βkkit + βmmit + ωit + it, (C.6)
where p˜it ≡
∑
j sijtPjt is the plant-level output price deflator, and we use that the (log) input bundle
can be decomposed into labor and capital input, scaled by their corresponding output elasticity β. The
additional error term it captures measurement error in either revenue or prices, as well as unanticipated
shocks to output.
In order to take equation (C.6) to the data, we need to take a stand on the input allocation or what
sijt is. We use revenue shares:
sijt =
Rijt∑
j Rijt
, (C.7)
which we can directly compute in our data. The use of revenue shares restricts the markups to be
the same across the products of a, potentially, multi-product plant. To see this it is useful to use the
framework of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) to recover markups and apply it to our setting. The
markup µijt is obtained using the FOC on input X of cost minimization:
µijt = β
X Rijt
PXit sijtXit
. (C.8)
Now, using equation (C.7), we get the following expression for markups:
µijt = β
X Rit
PXit Xit
(C.9)
which highlights that µijt = µit and ∀j ∈ Ji, with Ji the set of products produced by i.
Note that the reason we need to restrict markups across products within a plant to be constant, is
because we see aggregate input use only at the plant level.54 Finally, although we directly observe
revenues for all product-plant combinations, we only observe product specific prices and assume away
the variation across plants for a given product. In our empirical analysis, we rely on both the aggregate
price index and our constructed plant-specific price index.
C.2 Input price deflator
The construction of the input price deflator is very similar to that of the output price deflator. There
are, however, a few important differences. First, we need to distinguish between our three main input
categories: labor, intermediate inputs and capital. Second, for some of the inputs, we observe plant-
level input prices, that we can directly use to construct the deflator.
C.2.1 Labor and capital
We directly observe hours worked at the plant-level. We rely on the NBER capital deflator to correct
the capital stock series. The use of an aggregate deflator implies that we assume a common user cost
of capital across plants.
54See De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and De Loecker et al. (2012) for a detailed discussion of the input allocation
across products.
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C.2.2 Intermediate inputs
The data on intermediate input use is potentially the most contaminated by input price variation, both
in the cross-section and in the time series and, in particular, across the two types: VI and MM. As
discussed in the main text, both technologies use vastly different intermediate inputs or use inputs at
very different intensities. Note that the share of all intermediate inputs is not significantly different
across types, but this masks the underlying heterogeneity. Due to the very different input use, we are
concerned that the aggregate deflator does not fully capture the input price differences across plants
and time.
We construct a plant-level intermediate input price deflator in the following way. We consider n
intermediate inputs where n={Fuel (F), Electricity (E), Coal for coke (C), iron ore (I), iron and scrap
(S), Others (O)}. In the data we observe expenditures by intermediate input (MEint) and prices for each
input n (Pnit ).
The plant-level intermediate input price deflator is constructed as follows:
PMit =
∑
n
snitP
n
t (C.10)
snit =
MEint∑
nM
E
it
(C.11)
Pnt = N
−1∑
i
Pnit . (C.12)
In words, we compute the average price for a given input n, Pnt , and weigh this by the plant’s
input share snit. This structure still assumes a common input price for all plants for a given input n,
but it recognizes that the intensity can vary across plants. In practice we compute (C.12) for all but the
Fuel and Others categories. For those two, we directly rely on the NBER Fuel Price Deflator and the
aggregate input price deflator, respectively. The other categories are a combination of various inputs for
which we do not observe reliable input price data and, therefore, we decided to rely on the aggregate
input price deflator. In terms of the log specification of the production function mit = ln
(∑
n
MEint
PMit
)
.
Table C.1: Intermediate Input use across Technology
Intermediate Input Minimill Integrated
Electricity (γE) 0.09 0.08
Coal for Coke (γC) 0.00 0.22
Iron Ore (γI ) 0.00 0.10
Iron and Scrap (γI ) 0.25 0.07
Fuel (γF ) 0.06 0.08
Others (γO) 0.60 0.50
Note: We report average expenditure by intermediate input over total intermediate input at the plant
level. Averages are computed overall type-year observations. The Others category captures a long set
of smaller inputs such as chemicals and other components. See C.3 for the exact list.
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Figure C.1: Price Trends for Inputs
Panel A: Material Inputs
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Note: Base Year 1987=100. Price Indexes deflated by GDP deflator to express these in constant dollars.
Electricity, Coal, Iron and Steel Scrap, and Iron Ore price indexes are author calculations from Census
data. Fuels Price index is from the NBER-CES database.
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Table C.2: Input Shares: Materials
Panel A: Minimills Input Cost Share of Materials
Year Scrap Electricity Fuels Other
1963 .28 .07 .06 .60
1967 .26 .06 .05 .63
1972 .28 .08 .05 .59
1977 .30 .09 .07 .54
1982 .22 .13 .09 .55
1987 .30 .12 .05 .53
1992 .32 .10 .04 .53
1997 .37 .08 .04 .52
2002 .33 .09 .05 .52
Panel B: Vertically Integrated Input Cost Share of Materials
Year Coal for Coke Scrap Iron Ore Electricity Fuels Other
1963 .10 .08 .19 .02 .08 .52
1967 .10 .05 .16 .02 .06 .60
1972 .12 .05 .16 .03 .07 .57
1977 .17 .06 .13 .04 .14 .47
1982 .14 .07 .13 .06 .14 .46
1987 .12 .12 .12 .06 .08 .50
1992 .11 .08 .18 .06 .09 .47
1997 .09 .09 .19 .05 .09 .49
2002 .08 .11 .15 .06 .10 .50
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Table C.3: Detailed Material Use (in 2002) in millions of dollars
Minimills Vertically Integrated
Value Plants Value Plants
All other non-ferrous shapes and forms 168 (29)
All other steel shapes and forms 1,182 (32)
Cost of all other materials and components, 1,962 (80) 3,058 (42)
parts, containers, and supplies consumed
Coal used in the production of coke 1,056 (24)
Carbon and graphite electrodes 206 (60) 46 (18)
Clay Refractories 98 (35)
Dead-burned dolomite 26 (38) 61 (17)
Ferrochromium 32 (43) 67 (17)
Fluorspar 5 (29)
Ferrosilicon 37 (59) 51 (23)
Ferromanganese, silicomanganese, manganese 182 (57) 125 (21)
Ferrovanadium 31 (53)
Industrial chemicals 25 (26) 60 (18)
Industrial dies, molds, jigs, and fixtures 75 (28)
Iron and steel scrap 3,697 (62) 1,398 (26)
Lime fluxes, including quicklime 95 (55) 150 (21)
Lubricating oils and greases 26 (46) 94 (28)
and other petroleum products
Nickel 57 (34) 81 (16)
Nonclay refractories 107 (35)
Other ferroalloys 75 (48) 191 (21)
Other fluxes 39 (41)
Other 265 (165) 270 (72)
Oxygen 66 (51) 275 (24)
Total 8,703 6,983
Note: Plants are the number of plants that report use of particular material. Products with fewer that 15
plants (either minimills or vertical led integrated integrated) that use the particular product are dropped
due to disclosure restrictions.
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Figure C.2: Trajectory of Energy and Intermediate Input Share in Output
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Note: We compute the share of energy (intermediate inputs) using the deflated expenditure on energy
and intermediate inputs, where the deflators are input specific, as a share of deflated total shipments.
The data source is the NBER Manufacturing Database for industry code 3311.
D Production function and markups: theory and estimation
D.1 Including labor as a state
Our empirical framework can allow for adjustment costs in labor and therefore formally treating labor
as state variable. We modify their approach and include both labor lit and the technology indicator, ψi,
as a state variable in firm’s underlying dynamic problem. The firm’s state is sit ≡ {kit, lit, ωit, ψi},
and it’s investment policy function is therefore given by:
iit = it(kit, lit, ωit, ψi). (D.1)
Following Olley and Pakes (1996) we invert the investment function to obtain a control function
for productivity: ωit = hψ,t(kit, lit, iit).55 The first stage is in fact identical to the case in the main text:
q˜it = φψ,t(lit,mit, kit, iit) + it. (D.2)
This first stage serves to purge measurement error and unanticipated shocks to production form the
variation in output (q˜it). Consequently, after this first stage we know productivity up to the vector of
(unknown) production function coefficients β: ωit(β) ≡ φˆit − βllit − βmmit − βkkit.
A key component in the estimation routine is the law of motion on productivity that describes
how a plant’s productivity changes over time. The preliminary analysis indicated that exit, primarily by
integrated mills, was substantial. We allow plant survival to depend on the plant’s state variables; which
55We include labor as well and in fact including labor as another state is treated explicitly in Ackerberg et al. (2007) on
page section 2.4.1 pp. 4222-4223. However, formally this requires revisiting the invertibility of the new investment policy
function.
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in our case includes the technology dummy in addition to productivity, capital and labor. Following
Olley and Pakes (1996) we rely on a nonparametric estimate of plant’s survival at time t, given the
information set at time t− 1, It−1.
Define an indicator function χit to be equal to 1 if the firm remains active and 0 otherwise, and let
ωit be the productivity threshold a firm has to clear in order to survive in the market place.
The selection rule can be rewritten as:
Pr(χit = 1) = Pr [ωit ≥ ωt(lit, kit, ψi)|Iit−1]
= Pr [ωit ≥ ωt(lit, kit, ψi)|ωt(lit, kit, zit), ωit−1]
= ρt−1(ωt(lit, kit, ψi), ωit−1)
= ρt−1(lit−1, kit−1, iit−1, ψi, ωit−1)
= ρt−1(lit−1, kit−1, iit−1, iLit−1, ψi) ≡ Pit
From step 3 to 4 we use the fact that capital and labor are deterministic functions of (kt−1, lt−1, ψi, it−1, iLt−1).
We use the fact that the threshold at t is predicted using the firm’s state variables at t − 1 . As in Ol-
ley and Pakes (1996), we have two different indexes of firm heterogeneity, the productivity and the
productivity cutoff point. Note that Pit = ρt−1(ωit−1, ωit) and therefore ωit = ρ−1t−1(ωit−1,Pit).
We consider the following productivity process:
ωit = gψ(ωit−1, ωit) + ξit
= gψ(ωit−1, ρ−1t−1(ωit−1,Pit)) + ξit
= gψ(ωit−1,Pit) + ξit,
(D.3)
We recover estimates of the production function coefficients, β, by forming moments on this pro-
ductivity shock ξit. The identification of these coefficients relies on the rate at which inputs adjust to
these shocks. In particular, we allow both labor and capital to be dynamically chosen inputs, whereby
current values of capital and labor do not react to current shocks to productivity (ξit). Plants do, how-
ever, adjust their intermediate input use (scrap, energy, other material inputs) to the arrival of a pro-
ductivity shock ξit. While allowing for adjustment costs in capital is fairly standard in this literature,
we also allow for adjustment costs in labor. One could motivate this by appealing to for example the
relatively high unionization rates in the U.S. steel industry raise the potential for adjustment frictions
for labor.
We rely on the following moments:
E
ξit(β)
 litmit−1
kit
 = 0. (D.4)
The production function coefficients are very similar and in particular the coefficient on labor barely
changes. So both the production function coefficients and the associated reallocation analysis leed to
the same results, both in terms of point estimates and in terms of statistical significance.
D.2 Recovering markups
We briefly discuss how we recover markups using our plant-level panel on production and prices. Our
approach to recovering markups follows De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). In the rest of this section,
we briefly review the approach. In addition to the production function we introduced before, we only
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have to assume that producers active in the market minimize costs. LetVit denote the vector of variable
inputs used by the firm. We use the vector Kit to denote dynamic inputs of production. Any input that
faces adjustment costs will fall into this category; capital is an obvious one, but our framework allows
us to also include labor.
The associated Lagrangian function is:
L(V 1it , ..., V Vit ,Kit, λit) =
V∑
v=1
P
v
itV
v
it + ritKit + λit(Qit −Qit(V 1it , ..., V Vit ,Kit, ωit)) (D.5)
where P
v
it and rit denote a firm’s input prices for a variable input v and dynamic inputs, respectively.
The first-order condition for any variable input free of adjustment costs is
∂Lft
∂V vit
= P
v
it − λit
∂Qit(.)
∂V vit
= 0. (D.6)
where the marginal cost of production at a given level of output is λit, as ∂Lit∂Qit = λit. Rearranging
terms and multiplying both sides by VitQit , generates the following expression.
∂Qit(.)
∂V vit
V vit
Qit
=
1
λit
P vitV
v
it
Qit
(D.7)
Cost minimization implies that optimal input demand is realized when a firm equalizes the output
elasticity of any variable input V vit to
1
λit
P vitVit
Qit
.
Define markup µit as µit ≡ Pitλit . As De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) show, the cost-minimization
condition can be rearranged to write markup as:
µit = θ
v
it(α
v
it)
−1. (D.8)
where θvit denotes the output elasticity on an input V
v and αvit is the revenue share of variable input v,
defined by P
v
itV
v
it
PitQit
, which is data. This expression will form the basis for our approach: We obtain the
output elasticity from the estimation of a production function and only need to measure the share of an
input’s expenditure in total sales. In particular, in our setting, θvit = βm.
In our context, the output elasticities are obtained by relying on product-specific price deflators,
and potentially leave plant-level price variation left uncontrolled for. The latter is expected to bias the
output elasticity downward and, therefore, downward-bias the level of the markup. Under a Cobb-
Douglas production technology, this has no implications for the time-series pattern of markups and on
the comparison of markups across minimills and integrated producers – as long as the output elasticity
is fixed across types, which we explicitly allowed for and we could not find any statistical significant
difference between types.
D.3 Technology-specific production functions
In the main text we start allowing for technology-specific production functions, but we cannot reject the
null hypothesis (for individual and the sum of the coefficients) at any reasonable level of significance
level, that the technologies have different (Cobb-Douglas) coefficients. Consequently we proceed our
main analysis with a set of common production function coefficients.
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In this Appendix we that even in that setting our model actually allows for a fixed proportion
production function for the bundle of intermediates (and we could in principal allow the same for labor
although that a look at the data does not seem to suggest any meaningful differences), and at the same
time allows us to compare the efficiency of plants of different technologies. We turn to both the data
restrictions, and the underlying theoretical framework we rely on. The theoretical framework was in
fact determined by analyzing the more disaggregated intermediate input data.
D.3.1 Conceptual framework
Regardless of the differences, in any input of production, at a lower level of aggregation, our approach
rests on the following production fuction:
Q = LβlKβkM(ψ)βmΩ (D.9)
where M(ψ) is our aggregate bundle of intermediate inputs which is very different across types. Given
the specifics of both technologies in this industry we let this aggregate bundle be given by56:
M(ψ) = min{γψFF, γψEE, γψCC, γψI I, γψSS, γψOO} (D.10)
It is irrelevant whether we think of this production taking place inside the same plant or whether the
plant can buy this aggregate intermediate inputM(ψ) from a competitive supply at price PM (just as in
our Appendix on the Input price index). Ultimately what we use data on is the deflated expenditure on
total intermediates (our m˜ input variable). This observation is important as it allows us to rely on labor,
capital and total intermediate inputs and go ahead and estimate the production function over these three
well defined variables, and makes the comparison to the literature straight forward.
Of course with ideal data on all Mn inputs, we could in turn analyze that production process. Note
that this would not benefit our analysis whatsoever: we are interested in the productivity at the plant
level and how it differs across plants and time. The production process one level below would not have
any implications for this analysis. We just find it worthwhile reporting that both technologies get very
similar shares on this total intermediate input bundle, about sixty eight, but this is nothing deep. The
more disaggregated intermediate input use is of course as expected very different across technologies.
An additional benefit, at least to us, is that modeling the more disaggregated intermediate inputs in
this way is that changes to individual intermediate input’s prices do not directly affect the demand for
the other intermediate inputs since they have to move in exact proportions. However, the total input
price for the intermediate input bundle will change, as reflected by the weight of the intermediate input,
and will have an effect on the total intermediate input use.
D.3.2 Disaggregation
Having said this, there are of course substantial differences between Minimills and Integrated plants in
terms of their input use. If we were to estimate production functions at such a level we would most
likely find different production function coefficients. However, the data is not good enough for us to
estimate a disaggregated-material production function, or the disaggregation does not seem to suggest
much variation across types anyway (which is the case for the labor input).
56This is precisely in line with the referee’s comment on using more institutional details and knowledge in the modeling of
the production function, given that we are only concerned with estimating the production function for one particular industry.
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For labor use at the plant-level, it turns out that salaries per worker at minimills and vertically
integrated plants are very similar, and move in the same direction over time, as can be seen in Figure
C.1 Panel B. Likewise, the skill mix of workers, say blue versus white collar, does not seem to be very
different between minimills and vertically integrated plants.
For materials, there is more scope for variation in input use, and differences between minimills and
vertically integrated plants. Table C.1 reports the average share of an intermediate input’s expenditure
in total intermediate input expenditure by plant. Given our specification for the intermediate input
bundle M(ψ), these correspond to the parameters (γ).
The results are as expected: minimills do not use any coal and iron ore, while integrated plants use
much less scrap. It is interesting to note that both technologies are quite similar in electricity and fuel
consumption. While this table shows the average over our sample period, Tables C.2 further shows that
these shares are extremely stable over time. We see this again as an important piece of data to support
our interpretation of the productivity differences as coming from the overall (Hicks-neutral) efficiency
differences.
More specific to the issue of data quality at the lowest level of aggregation for intermediate inputs.
Table C.3 breaks out material use by plant for 2002. You can see that even for items that all Minimills
should use, such as Iron and Steel Scrap, a large fraction of plants do not report using any of it. Like-
wise, some materials that all Vertically Integrated plants should use, such as Coal Used for Coke, we
see a large number of plants that report having a blast furnace also reporting using no Coal for Coke.
We should emphasize that all of these inputs are necessary for a vertically integrated plant. So there is
a substantial amount of non-response in the material trailer that prevents us from using most plants to
estimates a disaggregated production function. Disregarding the issues of selection that would show up
if we dropped plants that did not report using a complete list of materials, we are close enough to the
disclosure threshold at Census to make any reduction in the sample a serious impediment.57
E Deriving decompositions
We provide more details on how we derive the various decompositions introduced in the main text. We
start with the standard aggregate productivity definition:
Ωt =
∑
i
sitωit (E.1)
where we define:
sit =
Rit∑
iRit
(E.2)
Rt =
∑
i
Rit (E.3)
and Rit is plant-level total sales.
57 This type of missing data is pervasive in the Census. In fact, the Steel Industry is perhaps the industry where collection
of these items is liable to be the most precise, and the Census of Manufacturing is also one of the better plant level datasets.
So even in the “best-case” conditions, we cannot do a disaggregated materials production function analysis.
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E.1 Standard OP
Olley and Pakes show that (E.1) can be written as:
Ωit = ω¯t +
∑
i
(sit − s¯t)(ωit − ω¯t)
= ω¯t + Γ
OP
t
(E.4)
with Nt the number of active plants at time t and:
ω¯t = N
−1∑
i
ωit (E.5)
s¯t = N
−1∑
i
sit (E.6)
E.2 Deriving the Between covariance
We show that aggregate productivity can be decomposed in a between technology covariance compo-
nent and an average type-specific productivity component, which in itself is decomposed into type-
specific within and covariance terms.
Start from (E.1) and simply break up the sum into the two technology types, i.e. ψ = {MM,V I}:
Ωt =
∑
i∈ψ=MM
sitωit +
∑
i∈ψ=V I
sitωit
= st(ψ = MM)
∑
i∈ψ=MM
sit
st(ψ = MM)
ωit
+ st(ψ = V I)
∑
i∈ψ=V I
sit
st(ψ = V I)
ωit
(E.7)
The second line multiplies and divides each term by the relevant total market share of the type in
the industry, i.e. st(ψ) =
∑
i∈ψ sit.
58
The last equation can now be rewritten as another weighted sum where we now sum over two
groups: minimills and integrated producers:
Ωt =
∑
ψ
st(ψ)Ωt(ψ) (E.8)
where
Ωt(ψ) =
∑
i∈ψ
sit
st(ψ)
ωit =
∑
i∈ψ)
sit(ψ)ωit (E.9)
58The OP-decomposition relies crucially on the property that the market shares sum to one. However, if we were to
simply split the summation across the two types, we could not isolate the within covariance term. To see this, note that∑
ψ Ωt(ψ) 6= Ωt, due to the fact that
∑
ψ,i sit(ψ) > 1.
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The second line uses that the market share of a plant in the total industry divided by the total type-
specific market share is equal to the plant’s market share in the type’s total sales (sit(ψ)). Formally:
sit(ψ) =
sit
st(ψ)
(E.10)
After having transformed the aggregate productivity expression into (E.8), we can rely on the same
insight as OP and decompose aggregate productivity into a unweighted average and a covariance com-
ponent. By transforming the expression using type-specific market shares we guarantee that the plant
market shares sum to one; a necessary condition for the OP decomposition.
Applying the OP decomposition idea to (E.8) gives us:
Ωt = Ω¯t(ψ) +
∑
ψ
(st(ψ)− 0.5)(Ωt(ψ)− Ω¯t(ψ))
= Ω¯t(ψ) + Γ
B
t
(E.11)
E.3 Within type decompositions
Starting from equation (E.11) we simply apply the OP decomposition by type ψ and use the fact that
we only have two technology types to obtain an expression for the average component:
Ω¯t(ψ) =
1
2
∑
ψ
(Ωt(ψ))
=
1
2
∑
ψ
(ω¯t(ψ) +
∑
i∈ψ
(sit(ψ)− s¯t(ψ))(ωit − ω¯t(ψ)))
=
1
2
∑
ψ
(ω¯t(ψ) + Γ
OP
t (ψ))
(E.12)
where we denote the average market share across a given type by s¯t(ψ) = N−1ψ
∑
i∈ψ sit(ψ).
E.4 Total decomposition
To arrive at the expressions used in the main text we introduce Γt(ψ) to denote a covariance of a given
type and use superscripts B and OP to indicate whether the covariance is between or within the type,
respectively. This gives us the following total decomposition of aggregate productivity:
Ωt =
1
2
∑
ψ
[ω¯t(ψ) + Γ
OP
t (ψ)] + Γ
B
t (ψ) (E.13)
If there was no entry or exit we can then directly evaluate the share of each component by tracking
Ωt over time. We incorporate the turnover process by relying on dynamic decompositions within
a given type and can always scale the various subcomponents back to the decomposition discussed
above.
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F Product reallocation
We do not see any evidence for reallocation of products within vertically integrated plants in response
to the entry of minimills. It seems like this type of intensive margin, within plant product switching,
is not an important factor in the industry, most likely due to the high costs of changing the production
process.
Table F.1 shows, for vertically integrated plants, the standard deviation, both within plant and be-
tween plants, for the fraction of revenues accounted for by sheet products: the sheet specialization
ratio. This ratio is given by the share of revenues accounted for by hot and cold rolled sheet. Notice
that the standard deviation if all plants were fully specialized into sheet or into bar would be given by
the usual binomial formula:
√
p(1− p) = 0.47. So a standard deviation of 0.40 indicates that plants
are reasonably close to being fully specialized in bar or sheet, and the standard deviation within a plant
of their sheet specialization ratio is only 0.11. This indicates that most of the movement in production
of sheet is happening between plants, not within the plant.
As well, we do not see a large change in the sheet specialization ratio for plants that produce some
sheet products over time. Thus, most of the reallocation towards sheet production is happening at the
extensive margin of plant selection. Note that it is precisely because of the lack of product reallocation
within plants, that we find such an important role for the head-to-head competition in the bar market. VI
plants did not reallocate away from the bar products, and instead we saw an exit of most bar-producing
integrated mills, leaving the high productivity sheet producing alive. Of course, this begs the question
of why the integrated mills could not switch production towards the high quality steel products (like
sheet). A simple model-based answer would be to think of each product to have a productivity threshold
associated to it (ωj), which a plant has to clear in order to be able to produce product j. In this context
it seems plausible that sheet and bar products are ranked as follows: ω(sheet)> ω(bar). As competition
for bar products increased, due to the minimill entry, the integrated mills who focussed primarily on
bar products, were simply not productive enough to engage in higher quality steel.
Table F.1: Product Mix: Within and Between Plants
Sheet Specialization Ratio
Mean 0.36
Standard Deviation 0.40
Between Std. 0.38
Within Std. 0.11
Observations 657
Plants 124
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G Alternative Aggregate Productivity Growth Measure and its Decom-
position
In order to deal with this potential concern, we closely follow Petrin and Levinsohn (2012)’s approach
to creating alternative decompositions of productivity growth.59 We first cast our decomposition into
the PL framework and discuss the measurement and implementation issues. Finally, we compute the
PL decomposition and verify the robustness of our main results, rather than pursuing a detailed analysis
of when and why these decompositions yield different results.60
G.1 Comparing both measures
The setup of PL is quite general, and we start by introducing the specifics of our application. First, we
rely on a Cobb-Douglas production, which implies that output elasticities for each input are constant
across plants and time, much like the application considered by PL.
A thorny issue is the treatment of capital. While PL work out the case for all inputs, in practice, we
face the challenge of how to measure the user cost of capital. If we ignore the contribution of capital
stock to aggregate productivity growth (APG hereafter), this will bias our results, both because capital
stock changed dramatically in this industry, and because vertically integrated plants and minimills have
different capital intensities. Thus, we treat labor and capital as inputs into production in our PL-style
productivity decompositions.61
Starting from PL’s equation (9) on page 711, and letting h index our inputs (l, k), we multiply and
divide by total revenue in the industry (
∑
i PiQi), yielding aggregate productivity growth between t−1
and t as:
APGt =
∑
i
PiQi∑
i PiQi
∑
i PiQi∑
i V Ai
∆ωit +
∑
i
PiQi∑
i PiQi
∑
i PiQi∑
i V Ai
∑
h
(βh − sih)∆hit
= θ
∑
i
msi∆ωit︸ ︷︷ ︸
TE
+ θ
∑
i
msi
∑
h
(βh − sih)∆hit︸ ︷︷ ︸
RE
, (G.1)
where all variables without a subscript it are approximated with the midpoint between their values at
times t and t− 1, and θ ≡
∑
i PiQi∑
i V Ai
(Domar weight for the steel industry), and ∆hit = lnhit− lnhit−1
where lower cases denote logs.
The second line of equation (G.1) shows that APG can be decomposed into a Technical Efficiency
(TE) component and a reallocation component (RE). The TE term is our plant improvement compo-
nent in equation (17) up to a scaling by θ. This rescaling will not affect our analysis of the share of
productivity growth coming from reallocation versus technical efficiency.62
Given our previous analysis, we can already say a lot about the various components in the PL
decomposition in equation (G.1). First, while materials can be thought of as a flexible input that is
59We rely on PL’s code downloaded from http://www.econ.umn.edu/˜petrin/programs.html, accessed
August 30, 2013.
60The specific comparison with Olley-Pakes type decompositions has been done carefully and in great length by PL and
subsequent work Nishida et al. (2013b,a).
61This implies that we need to insert a user cost of capital to measure the share of the expenditure on capital in total value
added. We use a value of 12 percent and verify the robustness of our results using different values.
62There is also a slight difference between our plant improvement term and PL due to the discrete nature of the data. In
PL, the midpoint of market share is used, while we rely on the lagged value.
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free from any frictions, we do allow for an imperfectly competitive output market. This imperfect
competition is plausible given the positive markups we found in Section 5.5.1. Thus, we should expect
there to be a wedge between an input’s output elasticity and the revenue share. For materials, our
variable input, the markup drives a wedge between the material revenue share and the firm’s output
elasticity. Second, for labor and capital, which we allow to face adjustment costs, this wedge will
be non-zero, irrespectively of whether there is imperfect competition in either the output or the input
market.63 This implies that there is the potential for the reallocation term in the PL framework to lead
to aggregate productivity growth: The movement of inputs across producers with different markups
and adjustment costs is a clear potential mechanism. Finally, from the raw data, as presented in Table
1 and Figure 1, we know that total employment dropped dramatically over the sample period, from
500,000 to 100,000. Moreover, the drop was almost entirely at integrated plants. Therefore, we expect
an important role of labor in when we break down the PL-reallocation term into the labor and capital.
G.2 Robust role of technology
To compute the APG for the industry, the left-hand side of equation (G.1), we need to deal with various
implementation issues. First, we know that there is substantial entry and exit across plants of different
technologies. Second, we need to approximate the continuous-time setup of PL to a discrete-time
analogue. In addition, plant-specific cost shares are inherently noisy.64 This leads us to the following
equation that we take to our data:65
APGt = ∆ ln(
∑
i
V Ait)−
∑
L,K
[∑
i∈A
aHi ∆hit +
∑
i∈B
aHit −
∑
i∈C
aHit−1
]
(G.2)
where aHi is the share of an input H’s expenditure in the industry’s total output V A (value added) with
H = {L,K} the input in levels, and A, B and C denotes continuers, entrants, and exiters, respectively.
The reallocation term RE is then simply recovered using the identity: REt = APGt − TEt.
Table G.1 presents the PL-decomposition of Aggregate Productivity Growth, for both the entire in-
dustry, and separately for minimills and vertically integrated plants. We show both the total productivity
growth in the steel industry (APG), as well as the shares accounted for by technical efficiency (TE), and
reallocation (RE). We also present the components of reallocation that can be attributed to the realloca-
tion of labor and capital. In the bottom panel of Table G.1, we also reproduce the share of productivity
growth accounted for by the within and covariance terms in the Olley-Pakes decomposition.
PL’s measure of APG for the steel industry is 59 percent, while in our prior analysis, we found
aggregate productivity growth of 22 percent.
The PL decomposition finds that 67 percent of productivity growth can be accounted for by tech-
nical efficiency, while the remaining 33 percent is due to reallocation. Our previous Olley-Pakes de-
compositions allocated 71 percent of productivity growth to the within component and 29 percent to
the covariance term. Thus, it seems that, for our industry, the two approaches agree as to the role of
reallocation of resources in explaining aggregate productivity growth. Indeed, once we account for
63See an extensive discussion of the wedge for inputs with adjustment costs, and their welfare implications in a dynamic
context, in Asker et al. (2013).
64See the discussion in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) on the need to correct the revenue shares as the raw data might,
for instance, lead to the wage bill over sales to lie anywhere from zero to a very large number. These plant-level shares are
interacted with plant-level changes in input use, and this noise in revenue shares can have large implications.
65See Section 7 in PL on the specifics of the discrete-time approximation for more detail on the derivation of this equation.
71
Appendix For Online Publication
sampling error in output elasticities β, we find overlapping 95-percent confidence intervals for these
decompositions.
Likewise, once we drill down to the technology level, we also find a similar share of productivity
growth accounted for by within-plant effects and reallocation between plants by the PL and Olley-
Pakes approaches. For vertically integrated plants, the TE component is 74 percent, while the within
component is 83 percent. For minimills, these numbers are 57 percent and 55 percent, respectively.
When applying the PL decomposition by technology, we find that the reallocation component for
integrated producers is substantial and that the labor term is large and negative at -26 percent. To
understand this effect, note that with a positive markup, any reduction in total output will be damaging
in terms of efficiency, as the market power induced quantity distortion is further accentuated. Thus,
even if the labor share sli and the output elasticity of labor βl are identical across all plants, when labor
falls among vertically integrated plants, this shows up as a negative reallocation term. Likewise, there is
a positive labor reallocation term for minimills of 11 percent, since minimills expanded their workforce
over the time period.
Table G.1: Alternative Decomposition
Sample APG Technical Efficiency (TE) Reallocation (RE) Labor RE Capital RE
Steel 0.59 67% 33% -16% 13%
Vertically Integrated 0.59 74% 28% -26% 23%
Minimill 0.61 57% 46% 11% -20%
Main Results from Table 7: Within and Reallocation
Sample Within Covariance
Steel 71% 29%
Vertically Integrated 83% 17%
Minimill 55% 45%
Note: All entries in the table, except for APG, are percentage shares of APG.
This logic does not directly translate to inputs that face substantial adjustment costs, such as capital,
where the wedge contains both markups and adjustment costs. We find that the capital accounts for 13
percent of APG, indicating that capital reallocation had a large role in efficiency gains for the industry.
We refer the reader to PL for a more thorough discussion of the interpretation of the capital reallocation
component.
Finally, just as in our previous discussion of static decompositions of productivity growth, we know
that plant entry and exit will confound the interpretation of the within and reallocation terms. This is
equally true of our PL decompositions, but given the continuous time approximation, we do not pursue
this analysis, and we appeal to our previous results on the importance of entry and exit.
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